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6
Do the Determinants of Program 
Participation Data Provide 
Evidence of Cream Skimming? 
James J. Heckman
Jeffrey Smith
This chapter considers the extent to which detailed data on the 
process of participation in a social program can provide researchers 
and policymakers with meaningful evidence on the nature and extent 
of cream skimming caused by a performance-management system. We 
illustrate our discussion with an empirical analysis of data collected as 
part of the National JTPA Study (NJS). These data allow us to empiri-
cally decompose the process of participation in the JTPA program into 
a series of stages: eligibility for the program, awareness of the program, 
application to the program, acceptance into the program, and enrollment 
into the program. This chapter reframes and reinterprets the analysis in 
Heckman and Smith (2004) for this volume.1
Conceptually, this chapter contributes to the literature by clarifying 
how and when data on multiple stages of the program participation pro-
cess provide credible evidence on the effect of performance standards 
on program participation. Decomposing the process into stages allows 
researchers to compare the determinants of participation across stages. 
Dividing the stages into those on which program staff (and thus perfor-
mance standards) have an important infl uence and those on which they 
do not provides suggestive evidence on the importance of performance 
standards for program participation.
Empirically, we make two major contributions. First, we document 
the importance of factors other than cream skimming induced by per-
formance standards in accounting for differences in JTPA participation 
among subgroups. In particular, the eligibility rules for JTPA play a 
major role in driving subgroup differences. Conditional on eligibility, 
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further subgroup differences emerge at the stage of program aware-
ness, something over which program staff have at most limited control. 
These fi ndings suggest caution regarding the conclusions from existing 
analyses that presume strong effects of cream skimming based solely 
on comparisons of the characteristics of program eligibles and program 
participants. 
Second, our analysis of the determinants of program enrollment 
conditional on application and acceptance into the program (the stage 
where we expect program staff to have the most control over the pro-
cess) yields some suggestive evidence consistent with cream skimming. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First we put 
this chapter into the context of the broader literature. We then present 
a framework for analyzing data on multiple stages of the program par-
ticipation process and discuss what such data can reveal regarding the 
empirical importance of cream skimming induced by performance 
standards in determining who gets served. The next section documents 
aspects of the JTPA program relevant for our analysis but not covered 
in Chapter 2. We then describe the data we use and the four training 
centers from the National JTPA Study at which much of the data were 
collected, followed by a detailed examination of four stages in the JTPA 
participation process: eligibility, program awareness, application and 
acceptance into the program, and formal enrollment. We decompose the 
program participation process in order to focus on how overall differ-
ences in participation probabilities across subgroups break down into 
effects at each stage of the participation process. The last section re-
views our conclusions and places them in the context of the volume as 
a whole.
CONTEXT
Our analysis fi ts into two broader literatures, one on the determi-
nants of participation in social programs and the other on the effects of 
performance management systems in social programs in general and in 
active labor market programs in particular. Currie (1996) surveys the 
literature on the determinants of participation in social programs; see 
also the long list of references in Heckman and Smith (2004).2 
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The majority of this literature focuses on participation in U.S. en-
titlement programs such as Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), 
Food Stamps, and Unemployment Insurance. Persons eligible for such 
programs are legally entitled to their benefi ts. In addition to the de-
cisions of potential participants, bureaucratic discretion plays a role 
even in entitlement programs as program staff can affect eligibility 
decisions—see, e.g., Parsons (1991) for the case of disability insur-
ance—and can affect the information available to potential participants 
as well as the hassle costs of participation in other program contexts. 
Empirical analyses of participation in entitlement programs typically 
focus on the demand side and analyze the effects of variation in the 
costs and benefi ts of participation among eligibles. 
A smaller literature considers U.S. nonentitlement programs, such 
as many employment and training programs, where participation con-
ditional on eligibility depends explicitly on both decisions by potential 
participants and decisions by program gatekeepers; we call such pro-
grams mutually voluntary programs. The JTPA program that we study 
represents such a program, as do National Science Foundation grants 
and admission to (selective) state colleges and universities (and many 
other programs). As noted in Chapter 2, under WIA (JTPA’s succes-
sor), so-called core services, such as job search assistance, represent 
an entitlement while more expensive services, such as classroom train-
ing, require participant interest, program staff approval, and meeting 
eligibility requirements. Analyses of the determinants of participation 
in mutually voluntary programs have many purposes, including inform-
ing, developing, and implementing econometric evaluation estimators; 
documenting or explaining differences in participation rates across 
groups; and examining the role of performance standards (and, in our 
case, the cream skimming they encourage) on participation patterns. 
Recent analyses in the context of active labor market programs include 
Mitnik (2009), Skedinger and Widerstedt (2007), and Weber (2008); 
see also the earlier references in Heckman and Smith (2004).3 
A vast general literature on the effects of performance management 
systems in government has arisen in the past two decades. Osborne 
and Gaebler (1992) and Osborne and Plastrik (1997) provide important 
popular treatments, while Heinrich and Lynn (2000), Forsythe (2001), 
and Radin (2006), among others, offer more scholarly overviews. In 
the narrower context of active labor market programs, the chapters in 
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this volume touch on many of the major strands of the literature, in-
cluding analyses of participation and service assignment patterns (as in 
this chapter), analyses of the effects of cross-sectional and time-series 
variation in the nature or presence of performance incentives on out-
comes (as in Chapter 7), studies of performance-based contracting (as 
in Chapter 8), and the correlation of performance measures with experi-
mental or econometric estimates of the causal effects of programs (as 
in Chapter 9). Chapters 7, 8, and 9 review the corresponding literatures 
in depth.
Our analysis in this chapter takes its inspiration from both of these 
literatures. The literature on participation in employment and training 
programs infl uences our choice of variables, including our examination 
of recent labor force status patterns. It also infl uences our interpretation 
of the results. The broader literature on program participation motivates 
our emphasis on variation across individuals in the expected costs and 
benefi ts of participation and our concern with program awareness. As 
discussed in more detail in the next section, the literature on the effects 
of performance management systems infl uences our thoughts on the 
evidentiary value of our analysis.
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING PARTICIPATION
IN SOCIAL PROGRAMS
This section outlines a descriptive framework for analyzing the 
determinants of participation in a social program using data on the char-
acteristics of random samples of individuals observed at each stage of 
the process and considers its analytic value. The framework follows 
individuals through multiple stages of a linear participation process, in 
which participation requires passing through a sequence of stages in a 
specifi c order. The particular stages in our framework spring from the 
data available to us and the (not unrelated) institutional details of the 
JTPA program examined in our empirical application. Generalizing our 
framework to allow for a nonlinear participation process (say, by ex-
plicitly accounting for the small fraction of JTPA participants sentenced 
to participate in the program by a judge or for individuals who reach 
JTPA via a referral from a service provider) or for a larger number or 
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smaller number of stages is straightforward. Moreover, our framework, 
and our discussion of the evidence it provides, both generalize well be-
yond JTPA and well beyond the context of active labor market policies. 
In order for a person to participate in JTPA, he or she must be eli-
gible for it, must be aware of it, must apply for it, must be accepted 
into it, and must be formally enrolled in it. Figure 6.1 depicts the pro-
cess of selection into the program. Different factors govern each stage 
of the process. Legislators defi ne the eligibility criteria that program 
staff members apply to each applicant. Program awareness depends on 
outreach efforts by program operators, on other aspects of the informa-
tional environment surrounding potential participants, such as friends 
who have participated or interaction with staff from other programs, 
and on potential participants’ prior beliefs about the costs and benefi ts 
of learning about employment and training programs.
Potential participants make application decisions based on the ex-
pected benefi ts and perceived costs of participation. Acceptance into 
a program depends on bureaucratic preferences over applicant types, 
which in many programs are determined in part by formal performance 
standards systems. Acceptance also depends on the willingness of the 
applicant to pursue the application process to its conclusion and on fur-
ther changes in opportunity costs, such as sudden illnesses or the arrival 
of job offers, during the application process.
Formal enrollment depends on both bureaucratic and personal pref-
erences. For example, as noted in Chapter 4, the JTPA performance 
Eligibility for JTPA 
  
Awareness of JTPA 
  
Application to JTPA 
  
Acceptance into JTPA 
  
Enrollment into JTPA 
Figure 6.1  The JTPA Selection Process
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standards system counted only the employment and wages of enrollees 
in a specifi ed period following termination from the program. As a re-
sult, local JTPA offi ces had an incentive to gain additional information 
about the potential employability of persons accepted into the program 
and to use it to guide their enrollment decisions. At the same time, the 
passage of time between acceptance and enrollment (as when waiting 
for a particular course to begin or looking for an employer willing to 
offer an OJT position) leads to changes in opportunity costs that may 
cause accepted applicants to decline enrollment when offered.
To more formally describe the participation process, consider the 
following conditional probabilities for a person with characteristics x: 
1) the probability of eligibility, 2) the probability of program awareness 
given eligibility, 3) the probability of application given eligibility and 
awareness, 4) the probability of acceptance given application, and 5) the 
probability of formal enrollment conditional on acceptance into a pro-
gram. In formal terms, we have
(6.1)  Pr( 1| )el x ,
(6.2) Pr( 1| 1, )aw el x  ,
(6.3) Pr( 1| 1, 1, )ap aw el x  
(6.4) Pr( 1| 1, 1, 1, )ac ap aw el x    ,
(6.5) Pr( 1| 1, 1, 1, 1, )en ac ap aw el x     ,
where el = 1 if a person is eligible for a program and zero otherwise, 
aw = 1 if a person is aware of a program and zero otherwise, ap = 1 if a 
person applies to a program and zero otherwise, ac = 1 if a person ap-
plies to and is accepted into a program and zero otherwise, and en = 1 if 
a person is formally enrolled in a program and zero otherwise.
As persons only participate in the program if they are eligible el = 1, 
are aware aw = 1, apply ap = 1, are accepted ac = 1, and formally enroll 
en = 1, we can decompose the probability of participation given X = x,
Pr( 1| )par x , into the fi ve components on the right-hand side of Equa-
tion (6.2):
(6.6) Pr( 1| )par x 
Pr( 1| 1, 1, 1, 1, ) Pr( 1| 1, 1, 1, )en ac ap aw el x ac ap aw el x        
Pr( 1| 1, 1, ) Pr( 1| 1, ) Pr( 1| )ap aw el x aw el x el x              ,
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where par = 1 if a person participates in a program and zero other-
wise. By estimating each of the fi ve component probabilities, we can 
determine the effect of each variable in x on the overall probability of 
participation and where and how it infl uences program participation. 
A variable that has no effect on the overall probability of participation 
may have strong, but offsetting, effects on the component probabilities.
In the sections that follow, we apply this framework to analyze par-
ticipation in the JTPA program. Data limitations force us to combine 
application and acceptance into a single step, which we call “applica-
tion/acceptance.” We equate acceptance into the program with reaching 
the stage of random assignment during the experimental evaluation of 
JTPA. Only eligible applicants who completed the aptitude and achieve-
ment tests required at most JTPA training sites and who received a 
written JTPA service plan were subject to random assignment. These 
conditions required a substantial commitment by JTPA training cen-
ters to continued interaction with the applicant, but fall short of formal 
enrollment into JTPA. The section titled “The Determinants of Enroll-
ment in JTPA” presents two sets of decompositions based on Equation 
(6.6). The fi rst set includes four stages: eligibility, awareness, appli-
cation/acceptance, and enrollment. In the second set, we decompose 
Pr( 1| 1, )ac el x  , the probability of application and acceptance con-
ditional on eligibility, into separate stages of awareness given eligibility 
and acceptance given awareness. Focusing solely on these two stages 
allows us to examine the effects of explanatory variables not included 
in the full decomposition due to data limitations or because they are 
perfect predictors of eligibility.
What can we learn from the analyses undertaken in the remainder 
of the chapter regarding the empirical importance of cream skimming 
induced by the JTPA performance standards system for the overall pat-
terns of participation in JTPA among various groups? To begin with, we 
can use institutional knowledge to divide the stages of the participation 
process into those affected and not affected by program staff. Subgroup 
differences in the determinants of passing through stages not affected 
by program staff, such as eligibility and (in the main) awareness clearly 
cannot result from cream skimming. The full decompositions presented 
in the section “The Determinants of Application/Acceptance into 
JTPA” reveal the relative importance of these stages for overall group 
differences. 
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For stages of the participation process potentially affected by both 
the decisions of potential participants and the decisions of caseworkers, 
our framework yields at best suggestive evidence. Consider a particular 
characteristic Z that positively affects employment and earnings out-
comes in the absence of participation and that both the caseworker and 
the researcher observe. Now consider a stage of the participation pro-
cess over which caseworkers have some control. A positive effect of Z 
on the probability of passing through this stage is consistent with cream 
skimming by caseworkers and so provides some suggestive evidence 
in that regard. At the same time, high-Z individuals might participate 
at higher rates even without cream skimming, perhaps because of a 
correlation between observed Z and unobserved motivation or because 
high-Z individuals expect to benefi t more from program participation. 
By contrast, a negative effect of Z indicates that cream skimming is not 
the dominant infl uence on whether or not high-Z individuals transit this 
stage of the participation process. It does not, however, demonstrate the 
absence of cream skimming, because a negative estimated effect might 
simply result from other factors working in the opposite direction over-
powering caseworker efforts.
Our empirical analysis is deliberately descriptive. We seek to es-
tablish empirical regularities about the participation process in the 
JTPA program as it existed at the time our data were generated. These 
regularities suggest interesting behavioral relationships governing the 
process of program participation. They are not causal (or “structural” 
in the sense that economists use that term). For example, we would 
expect substantive changes in the eligibility rules to change not only 
the determinants of eligibility, but the conditional determinants at the 
other stages as well. We do not require causal effects to make the in-
ferences we do. The analyses in this chapter complement, rather than 
substitute for, related analyses in the literature that aim to estimate the 
causal effects of performance standards on program behavior by mak-
ing use of plausibly exogenous variation in the presence or details of 
such standards. Examples of such analyses include Chapters 7 and 8 in 
this volume, as well as Cragg (1997), Courty and Marschke (2008), and 
Courty, Kim, and Marschke (forthcoming). 
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THE JTPA PROGRAM
JTPA was the primary U.S. federal employment and training pro-
gram for the disadvantaged until replaced by the programs fi nanced 
under WIA in 1998. JTPA provided classroom training in occupational 
skills, remedial education, job search assistance, work experience, and 
subsidized on-the-job training (essentially a temporary wage subsidy) at 
private fi rms for approximately one million persons each year. Chapter 
2 gives an overall picture of the program, compares it to its predeces-
sors and to WIA and, along with Chapter 4, details its performance 
management system. This discussion focuses on the details of JTPA 
eligibility determination, which have special relevance to the analysis 
in this chapter.
There were two primary avenues to eligibility for JTPA. The fi rst 
and most important avenue was economic disadvantage, which oc-
curred if one of two criteria were met: 1) low family income in the six 
months prior to application to the program, or 2) being in a family re-
ceiving cash public assistance such as Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), general assistance, or Food Stamps.4 The short win-
dow for income eligibility allowed highly skilled and normally highly 
paid workers to become eligible for JTPA after being out of work only 
a few months. According to the USDOL (1993), in program year 1991 
around 93 percent of JTPA participants qualifi ed because they were ec-
onomically disadvantaged. A second avenue to eligibility was an “audit 
window’’ that allowed up to 10 percent of participants at each JTPA 
training center to be noneconomically disadvantaged persons with 
other barriers to employment such as limited ability in English.5 Due 
to the subjective nature of these barriers, and the resulting diffi culty in 
determining who is affected by them, at some stages in the participa-
tion process (described in more detail below) we consider only persons 
eligible by virtue of being economically disadvantaged. Devine and 
Heckman (1996) discuss the eligibility rules for JTPA and their impli-
cations for the composition of the eligible population.6 
There are some differences between the eligibility criteria and ser-
vices offered in JTPA compared to its predecessors, the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act (CETA) and the Manpower Develop-
ment and Training Act (MDTA), and its successor, the WIA program. 
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Barnow (1993) suggests that these differences are modest in regard to 
CETA and MDTA. USDOL (1998), O’Shea and King (2001), and Social 
Policy Research Associates (2004; see especially Exhibit 1) document 
the details of the WIA program. Universal eligibility for low-intensity 
core services under WIA represents the largest difference between WIA 
and JTPA. By law, local programs must give priority to transfer pro-
gram participants and other low income individuals when allocating 
intensive and training services. For these more expensive services, but 
not for the core job fi nding services, the WIA participation process re-
mains broadly similar to that under JTPA. 
DATA
The primary source of our data is the NJS, an experimental evalu-
ation of the JTPA program conducted from 1987 to 1989.7 We use data 
on JTPA, even though the program no longer exists, because similar 
data do not exist for the WIA program. As argued in Chapter 3, the pro-
grams have enough in common in terms of the populations they serve, 
the services they provide, and the institutions that provide them that, at 
a general level, the inferences we make regarding the relative impor-
tance of cream skimming and other factors in determining participation 
patterns likely carry over to WIA. 
In the NJS, persons accepted into JTPA at a nonrandom sample of 
16 JTPA training centers were randomly assigned into either a control 
group excluded from JTPA (for 18 months) or a treatment group given 
access to JTPA services. In order to learn more about the JTPA-eligible 
population, and to facilitate the development of better nonexperimental 
evaluation methods, data were collected on JTPA-eligible nonpartici-
pants (ENPs) at 4 of the 16 centers. We describe these 4 centers in 
detail in the next section. The ENP sample includes only individuals eli-
gible via the economic disadvantage criterion as determined by a short 
household screening instrument. 
Detailed information on demographic characteristics, labor market 
histories, transfer program participation, and family composition and 
income was collected on the ENPs and on experimental control group 
members at the same four sites. We use this information for our analy-
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ses of awareness of JTPA and of application/acceptance into JTPA. For 
the experimental treatment group, we have only the limited information 
on characteristics collected shortly before random assignment. We use 
these data to study enrollment into JTPA at the four sites. 
The NJS did not collect data on persons ineligible for JTPA. In or-
der to analyze the determinants of eligibility we use a national sample 
drawn from the 1986 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program Par-
ticipation (SIPP). Devine and Heckman (1996) use the SIPP for their 
detailed study of JTPA eligibility; our dataset is a close cousin of theirs. 
The SIPP data are well suited to this purpose because they contain suf-
fi cient information to precisely determine JTPA eligibility via economic 
disadvantage. We treat the SIPP panel as a series of repeated cross-
sections, and create a dataset consisting of person-months.8
The data we use have, not surprisingly, both advantages and disad-
vantages. In terms of advantages, both the SIPP and ENP data measure 
eligibility via economic disadvantage relatively precisely. All of the 
surveys from the NJS obtained relatively high response rates; the SIPP 
does less well on this dimension. Measurement of both acceptance 
and enrollment in JTPA relies on administrative data, and so avoids 
the problems of systematic measurement error in survey measures of 
program participation documented by Smith and Whalley (2009) for 
JTPA and by Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan (2009) for a wide variety of 
other programs. The key disadvantages associated with our data include 
the lack of separate information on program application and our reli-
ance on only four nonrandomly selected sites for the ENP and JTPA 
participant data. The latter becomes problematic when combined with 
national-level data from the SIPP and when attempting to generalize to 
the overall JTPA eligible and participant populations.
THE FOUR SITES FROM THE NATIONAL JTPA STUDY
Detailed data on ENPs were collected from the geographic areas 
served by four training centers: Corpus Christi, Texas; Fort Wayne, In-
diana; Jersey City, New Jersey; and Providence, Rhode Island. Table 
6.1 provides descriptive information about these centers in order to pro-
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vide some context for our analysis. The table notes provide details on 
the sources and defi nitions of the variables.
The fi rst three columns of Table 6.1 present the race/ethnicity of the 
eligible adult population at each site, constructed using the data on the 
ENPs and the experimental control group. The sites vary widely on this 
dimension, with a strong Hispanic majority in Corpus Christi, a strong 
African American majority in Jersey City, almost exclusively whites in 
Fort Wayne, and a broad mix in Providence. The fourth column presents 
mean years of schooling among adult eligibles at each site. Here we fi nd 
less variation, though Providence stands out as an outlier on the low 
side, with a mean below 11 years.
The fi fth and sixth columns provide economic context in the form 
of the unemployment and the poverty rates, respectively. Corpus Christi 
and Jersey City have relatively weak economic situations at this time, 
while Providence and (especially) Fort Wayne were experiencing rela-
tively low unemployment and poverty rates.
The fi nal three columns summarize the service recommendations 
that the JTPA participants in the experimental samples at these training 
centers received prior to random assignment. In the jargon of the Na-
tional JTPA Study, the “CT-OS treatment stream” denotes individuals 
recommended for classroom training in occupation skills (and possibly 
other services, but not on-the-job training), the “OJT treatment stream” 
denotes individuals recommended for on-the-job training (and possibly 
other services, but not classroom training in occupational skills), and 
the “other treatment stream” is a residual category. Most of those rec-
ommended for CT-OS either receive it or do not enroll at all (and thus 
receive at most very minimal services), but many of those recommended 
for OJT end up enrolling but receiving only job search assistance be-
cause no employer can be found who will offer them an on-the-job 
training slot. The sites differ in their service mix for a number of rea-
sons, including the availability of local training providers of suffi cient 
size and quality, the state of the local economy, and whether the center 
leadership has a “work fi rst” or “learn fi rst” orientation. Among the 
four sites in our study, Jersey City emphasizes classroom training, Fort 
Wayne and Corpus Christi emphasize on-the-job training, and Provi-
dence emphasizes other services.
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Corpus Christi 0.25 0.08 0.66 11.33 10.2 13.4 34.3 51.5 14.1
Fort Wayne 0.74 0.23 0.02 11.28 4.7 5.9 6.4 66.2 27.3
Jersey City 0.05 0.68 0.24 11.51 7.3 18.9 46.0 35.7 18.3
Providence 0.32 0.28 0.31 10.72 3.8 12.1 32.3 13.0 54.7
SOURCE: Characteristics of the adult eligible population at each site come from the authors’ calculations using the National JTPA Study 
data on the ENPs and the experimental control group. Following Heckman and Smith (1999), we assign the ENPs a weight of 0.97 and 
the controls a weight of 0.03 in calculating these averages. The numbers for race/ethnicity do not add up to 1.00 because other race/
ethnicity individuals are omitted. The unemployment rates (unweighted annual averages for 1987–1989) are from Exhibit 3.3 of Orr et 
al. (1996). Poverty rates (for 1979) are from Exhibit 3.2 of Orr et al. (1996). The treatment stream recommendation fractions come from 
Kemple, Doolittle, and Wallace (1993, Table 7.1). As noted in the text, these refer to the services for which individuals in the National 
JTPA Study were recommended prior to random assignment. The CT-OS treatment stream corresponds to individuals recommended for 
classroom training in occupational skills and possibly other services not including on-the-job training. The OJT treatment stream refers 
to individuals recommended for subsidized on-the-job training at private fi rms plus possibly other services not including CT-OS. The 
other treatment stream is a residual category. 
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Overall, these four sites vary on geographic (two in the North-
east, one in the Southwest, and one in the Midwest), demographic, 
economic, and programmatic dimensions. Although neither the 4 sites 
nor the 16 sites represent random samples of all JTPA training centers, 
the sites examined in this chapter nonetheless do a good job of captur-
ing the diversity present in the population of sites. In addition, the site 
characteristics presented here provide a context for, and aid in the inter-
pretation of, the results that follow.9
THE DETERMINANTS OF ELIGIBILITY
FOR THE JTPA PROGRAM
This section examines the determinants of eligibility for JTPA. Ta-
ble 6.2 defi nes the explanatory variables used in this chapter. Tables 6.3 
and 6.4 present the results of logit analyses of the determinants of eligi-
bility. Table 6.3 presents results for adult (aged 22 and above) men and 
women, and Table 6.4 presents the results for male and female out-of-
school youth (aged 16–21). We focus on these four demographic groups 
throughout our empirical analysis for three reasons. First, they are the 
groups employed in the experimental impact reports, in our other work 
utilizing these data, and in some of the other chapters in this volume. 
Second, because of differences around family responsibilities and ed-
ucation, we would expect men and women, and youth and adults, to 
behave differently. Third, we have no NJS data on in-school youth, as 
this group was excluded from the experimental analysis.
The fi rst column for each demographic group in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 
displays estimated coeffi cients and associated standard errors (in pa-
rentheses) from logit models of the probability of eligibility derived 
from the SIPP data. The second column displays estimates of the mean 
derivative of the probability of eligibility with respect to each charac-
teristic (in square brackets) along with p-values from tests of the null 
hypotheses that each population coeffi cient equals zero.10 
A number of interesting fi ndings emerge from this analysis. 
First, even after controlling for family income and productivity char-
acteristics, race and ethnicity are very important determinants of the 
probability of eligibility. For example, for adult females, the difference 
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Table 6.2  Defi nitions of Variables
Site indicators 
Fort Wayne, Jersey City, and Providence indicate the site of residence. Corpus 
Christi is the omitted site. 
Race and ethnicity 
Black, Hispanic, and other race/ethnicity indicate race or ethnicity. Whites are 
the omitted group. 
Age 
Age categories indicate age at the time of eligibility determination or of the 
participation decision. The omitted category is 16–18 years for youth and 
22–29 years for adults. 
Highest grade completed 
Schooling categories indicate the highest grade of formal schooling com-
pleted. The omitted category is exactly 12 years. 
Low English ability 
This variable indicates low ability in English. For the ENPs, this means that 
the person completed the baseline interview in a language other than English. 
For the controls, it means that the person indicated a language other than 
English in response to a survey question on language preference. 
Marital histories 
These categories indicate the respondent’s marital status history. The omit-
ted category is single, never married. In Tables 6.16 and 6.17, the divorced, 
widowed, and separated category is broken up into two categories, one for 
persons who were last married from 1–24 months ago and one for persons 
who were last married more than 24 months ago. 
Presence of young children 
Children younger than six years old indicates an own child less than six years 
old in the household. 
Current AFDC receipt 
This variable indicates that the respondent was receiving benefi ts under the 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, either as a case head or as 
part of someone else’s case. 
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Current Food Stamp receipt 
This variable indicates that the respondent was in a household receiving Food 
Stamps. 
Current labor force status 
These variables indicate whether the respondent was employed, unemployed 
(not working but looking for work), or out of the labor force (not employed 
and not looking for work). The omitted category is currently employed. 
Labor force status transitions 
These categories in Tables 6.8 and 6.9 and Tables 6.16–6.19 indicate the two 
most recent labor force statuses in the seven months up to and including the 
month of the participation decision. The second status in each pattern indi-
cates the labor force status at the time of the participation decision. The fi rst 
status indicates the status of the most recent prior spell during the preceding 
six months. Thus, the pattern “employed → unemployed” indicates someone 
who was unemployed at the time of the participation decision but whose most 
recent prior labor force status within the preceding six months was employed. 
Persons in the same labor force status for all seven months have repeated 
patterns of the form “OLF → OLF.” The omitted pattern is “employed → 
employed,” indicating persistent employment. In some cases, the “employed 
→ OLF” and “unemployed → OLF” categories are collapsed due to small 
sample sizes. 
Time since most recent employment 
These categories indicate the number of months since the person was last 
employed. The omitted category is currently employed. 
Family income in the last year 
These categories indicate total family earnings in the past year. The omitted 
category is less than $3,000. For some tables, the original six categories are 
combined into four due to small sample sizes. 
Table 6.2  (continued)
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Table 6.3  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of JTPA Eligibility: Adults
Adult males Adult females
Black  1.315 [0.060] 2.172 [0.129]
(0.034) 0.000 (0.032) 0.000 
Hispanic 1.070 [0.048] 2.270 [0.136]
(0.036) 0.000 (0.030) 0.000 
Other race/ethnicity 1.352 [0.062] 1.551 [0.090]
(0.087) 0.000 (0.051) 0.000 
Aged 30–39 −0.860 [−0.038] 0.018 [0.001]
(0.030) 0.000 (0.026) 0.489 
Aged 40–49 −0.939 [−0.042] 0.144 [0.007]
(0.040) 0.000 (0.030) 0.000 
Aged 50–54 −1.586 [−0.064] 0.047 [0.002]
(0.049) 0.000 (0.035) 0.176 
Highest grade < 10 0.737 [0.033] 0.974 [0.060]
(0.034) 0.000 (0.029) 0.000 
Highest grade 10–11 0.292 [0.012] 0.514 [0.031]
(0.033) 0.000 (0.028) 0.000 
Highest grade 13–15 −0.231 [−0.009] −0.408 [−0.022]
(0.031) 0.000 (0.025) 0.000 
Highest grade > 15 −0.064 [−0.003] −1.652 [−0.075]
(0.036) 0.074 (0.032) 0.000 
Currently married 0.157 [0.006] 1.366 [−0.074]
(0.035) 0.000 (0.029) 0.000 
Div.-wid.-sep. 0.177 [0.007] 0.043 [0.003]
(0.042) 0.000 (0.031) 0.162 
Child age < 6 years −0.205 [−0.008] 0.646 [0.035]
(0.036) 0.000 (0.027) 0.000 
Family income $3,000–$6,000 0.113 [0.019] −0.367 [−0.039]
(0.050) 0.024 (0.044) 0.000 
Family income $6,000–$9,000 −1.814 [−0.206] −1.737 [−0.154]
(0.048) 0.000 (0.043) 0.000 
Family income $9,000–$12,000 −3.103 [−0.268] −2.671 [−0.214]
(0.056) 0.000 (0.043) 0.000 
Family income $12,000–$15,000 −3.857 [−0.295] −3.318 [−0.249]
(0.056) 0.000 (0.044) 0.000 
chapter6.indd   141 4/27/2011   9:47:22 AM
142   Heckman and Smith
in the average probability of eligibility for blacks and Hispanics relative 
to whites exceeds 0.12 holding the resource variables constant.
Being married has a large negative estimated effect on the eligibil-
ity probabilities for all groups except adult males. The eligibility status 
of adult males is driven primarily by their own income, while for adult 
females and for youth, eligibility status depends in large part on the 
earnings of other family members. For all demographic groups except 
adult males, the presence of an own child under the age of six living in 
the home substantially increases the probability of eligibility for JTPA. 
Children raise the income cutoff for eligibility by increasing household 
size but do not add to the family income. In addition, years of schooling 
have an important impact on eligibility for all groups.
Not surprisingly, the probability of eligibility decreases mono-
tonically with family income for all four demographic groups. The 
magnitude of the estimated average derivatives is very large for family 
income categories corresponding to incomes above $6,000. For adult 
males, raising family income from less than $3,000 to between $9,000 
and $12,000 produces a decrease in the average probability of JTPA 
eligibility of 0.268. For male and female youth, the estimated average 
derivatives are larger still, refl ecting the differential importance of fam-
ily resources in determining eligibility for these groups.
Table 6.3  (continued)
Adult males Adult females
Family income > $15,000 −4.966 [−0.331] −4.461 [−0.301]
(0.048) 0.000 (0.037) 0.000 
Constant −0.474 [0.000] 4.714 [0.000]
(0.033) 0.000 (0.043) 0.000 
Number of observations 80,598 89,196
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, 
and p-values are below the mean derivatives. Person-month data from the 1986 SIPP 
full panel. Omitted categories in the logit are white, aged 22–29, highest grade equals 
12, never married, no young children, and family income less then $3,000. Using the 
sample proportion eligible as the cutoff value, the within-sample prediction rates for 
adult males are 72.48 percent for eligibles and 91.10 percent for noneligibles. The 
corresponding rates for adult females are 79.82 percent for eligibles and 88.32 percent 
for noneligibles.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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Table 6.4  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of JTPA Eligibility: Youth
Male youth Female youth 
Black                1.111 [0.056] 2.446 [0.155]
(0.164) 0.000 (0.092) 0.000
Hispanic             2.255 [0.121] 1.114 [0.068]
(0.103) 0.000 (0.076) 0.000
Other race/ethnicity 1.514 [0.078] 2.065 [0.129]
(0.195) 0.000 (0.408) 0.000
Aged 19–21 −0.434 [−0.021] 0.124 [0.007]
(0.082) 0.000 (0.070) 0.079
Highest grade < 10 1.959 [0.100] 0.915 [0.057]
(0.105) 0.000 (0.107) 0.000
Highest grade 10–11 1.469 [0.074] 0.134 [0.008]
(0.109) 0.000 (0.086) 0.118
Highest grade > 12 −0.150 [−0.007] −0.617 [−0.036]
(0.107) 0.160 (0.072) 0.000
Currently married −1.657 [−0.068] 0.609 [0.036]
(0.168) 0.000 (0.082) 0.000
Div.-wid.-sep.        −3.041 [−0.106] 1.511 [0.094]
(0.380) 0.000 (0.242) 0.000
Child age < 6 years 1.161 [0.061] 1.468 [0.090]
(0.168) 0.000 (0.081) 0.000
Family income $3,000–
$6,000 
−2.582 [−0.387] −1.306 [−0.201]
(0.153) 0.000 (0.102) 0.000
Family income $6,000–
$9,000
−4.370 [−0.547] −3.008 [−0.436]
(0.165) 0.000 (0.126) 0.000
Family income $9,000–
$12,000 
−4.595 [−0.561] −4.237 [−0.552]
(0.157) 0.000 (0.144) 0.000
Family income $12,000–
$15,000 
−5.935 [−0.631] −5.057 [−0.610]
(0.204) 0.000 (0.142) 0.000
Family income > $15,000 −6.628 [−0.660] −6.585 [−0.695]
(0.153) 0.000 (0.103) 0.000
Constant             6.246 [0.000] 6.164 [0.000]
(0.170) 0.000 (0.117) 0.000
Number of observations 10,280 11,165
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, and 
p-values are below the mean derivatives. Person-month data from 1986 SIPP full panel. 
Omitted categories in the logit are white, aged 16–18, highest grade equals 12, never 
married, no young children, and family income less than $3,000. Using the sample pro-
portion eligible as the cutoff value, the within-sample prediction rates for male youth 
are 71.95 percent for eligibles and 90.67 percent for noneligibles. The corresponding 
rates for female youth are 72.72 percent for eligibles and 91.32 percent for noneligibles.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
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As we detail in the table notes, the small set of characteristics in-
cluded in the specifi cations reported in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 do well at 
predicting within-sample eligibility status. For all four groups, over 70 
percent of the eligibles and almost 90 percent of the noneligibles are 
correctly predicted when we use the overall eligibility rate within each 
group to defi ne the cutoff for predicting eligibility. Taken together, our 
results demonstrate that the eligibility rules for JTPA produced sub-
stantial group differences in access to subsidized government training. 
These differences have no link to the presence of a performance man-
agement system within JTPA.
THE DETERMINANTS OF AWARENESS
OF THE JTPA PROGRAM
This section investigates the determinants of awareness of the JTPA 
program using data on the controls and ENPs at the four JTPA sites 
described earlier. The concept of program awareness is an elusive but 
important one. Differential access to information about the program can 
affect awareness and thereby infl uence participation. Language barriers 
are an obvious case in point. However, awareness also depends on the 
incentives a person has to participate in the program. In some cases 
the desire to participate may infl uence awareness rather than awareness 
independently infl uencing participation. 
As we lack evidence on individuals’ information-gathering activi-
ties, we cannot determine the extent to which information costs, and 
therefore program awareness, play a causal role in determining pro-
gram participation choices. However, the evidence presented in this 
section indicates that awareness of JTPA among those eligible for it 
is by no means universal, and that program awareness appears to be 
related to the likelihood of participation in the program, to education, 
and to language skills. We also present evidence that a sizeable fraction 
of persons who are eligible for the program do not believe that they are 
eligible for it. Taken together, this evidence suggests that barriers to in-
formation represent an important determinant of program participation.
Each member of the ENP sample was asked whether or not he or 
she had heard of the JTPA program. In keeping with the decentral-
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ized nature of the program, local training sites often selected operating 
names other than JTPA. To overcome this problem, ENPs were asked 
about their awareness of JTPA using the program’s primary name in 
their locality. This measure does not capture general awareness of the 
existence of programs like JTPA among individuals not aware of JTPA 
by its local name. Persons who indicated that they were aware of the 
program were then asked whether or not they believed themselves to 
be presently eligible for it. Control group members are assumed to be 
aware of JTPA and of their own eligibility for it. 
Table 6.5 presents rates of awareness and self-reported eligibility 
for ENPs in each major demographic group. The fi rst column presents 
the fraction of the ENPs who have heard of JTPA. These fractions are 
surprisingly low. For all four groups, the awareness rate is below 50 
percent. The rate is higher for youth than for adults, which may indi-
rectly refl ect requirements that sites expend 40 percent of their training 
resources on youth, who constitute much less than 40 percent of the eli-
gible population. The second column gives the fraction of those persons 
aware of the program who think that they are eligible for it. Note that all 












Adult males 0.3539 0.3598 0.1274
(0.0167) (0.0311) (0.0116)
Adult females 0.4165 0.4594 0.1913
(0.0124) (0.0214) (0.0099)
Male youth 0.4722 0.5672 0.2678
(0.0373) (0.0610) (0.0330)
Female youth 0.4667 0.5410 0.2525
(0.0289) (0.0453) (0.0251)
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. National JTPA Study data. Respondents are 
coded as aware of JTPA if they report having heard of JTPA by its most common local 
name. Respondents are coded as self-reported eligibles if they are aware of JTPA and 
report that they believe themselves to be presently eligible for it.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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of the ENPs are determined to be eligible at the time of their screening 
interviews and that nearly all are still eligible at the time the awareness 
question was asked in the baseline interview. Conditional on awareness, 
only 36 percent of adult males, 46 percent of adult females, and around 
55 percent of youth realize that they qualify for JTPA services. Taking 
the product of these two probabilities yields the unconditional prob-
ability of awareness and self-reported eligibility appearing in the third 
column. Barely 12 percent of adult male eligibles can identify both the 
program and their own eligibility for it. Even among youth, only about 
25 percent of eligibles are both aware of the program and of their own 
eligibility for it. These fi gures suggest that there are substantial costs 
associated with fi nding out about social programs such as JTPA and 
about the rules governing access to their services, and that information 
costs play an important role in producing demographic differentials in 
program participation.
The results from a logit analysis of the determinants of awareness 
of the JTPA program appear in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. These tables have 
the same basic structure as Tables 6.3 and 6.4. These estimates result 
from the pooled sample of ENPs and experimental controls at the four 
sites in the NJS that collected ENP data. Following Heckman and Smith 
(1999), we weight the data such that the ENPs and controls represent 
0.97 and 0.03 of the overall eligible population, respectively. 
For all four demographic groups, black eligibles are relatively more 
likely than white eligibles to know about JTPA. Adult Hispanic eligi-
bles are relatively less likely than whites to know about JTPA, with 
the difference being statistically signifi cant in both cases. The negative 
and statistically signifi cant coeffi cient estimates for Hispanic adult eli-
gibles arise even after controlling for facility with the English language 
and for level of education.11 Language skills and educational defi cits 
play a role in explaining this phenomenon but more than just language 
defi cits are involved. Tienda and Jensen (1988) fi nd that Hispanics par-
ticipate less in government programs compared to non-Hispanics with 
the same basic economic characteristics; this suggests that they may 
obtain less information about programs such as JTPA from their social 
environment.
Consistent with the standard human capital model (see, e.g., Becker 
[1964]), older adults have statistically signifi cantly lower probabilities 
of awareness of the program than persons age 22 to 29. This may refl ect 
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the reduced demand for skill enhancement programs with age docu-
mented in, e.g., Leigh (1995). The pattern with respect to education is 
hump-shaped. Persons with the lowest levels of schooling have lower 
conditional probabilities of awareness than those who have completed 
high school. This evidence supports the notion of substantial informa-
tion processing costs among those with very low levels of schooling. A 
lower likelihood of participating in JTPA, and hence a lower value to 
information about the program, accounts for the evidence that the most 
educated persons are less aware of the program. More specifi cally, indi-
viduals with high levels of education have low incentives to know about 
poverty reduction programs, as they are not typically eligible for them.
Among adults, divorced, widowed, or separated eligibles have 
a higher probability of awareness than do those who are single. The 
difference is both statistically and substantively signifi cant for adult 
males. For three of the four groups, living in a family that receives 
Food Stamps has a positive effect on the probability of being aware of 
JTPA, while living in a family that receives AFDC has a positive effect 
only for adult males and for female youth. The estimated effect of liv-
ing in a family receiving Food Stamps is large, with mean derivatives 
of 0.164 and 0.133, and it is statistically signifi cant for both adult males 
and females. As nearly all of the adult female AFDC recipients also 
receive Food Stamps, the negative (essentially zero) coeffi cient on the 
AFDC variable indicates the additional effect of receiving both AFDC 
and Food Stamps, rather than just Food Stamps. Interpreted in this way, 
the absence of any AFDC effect becomes less surprising. The strong 
effects observed for Food Stamp receipt are consistent with the practice 
in that program of providing recipients with information about training 
opportunities.
Unemployed (i.e., out of work but actively looking for work) 
eligibles have a higher probability of program awareness for all four 
demographic groups. This difference between the unemployed and the 
employed is statistically signifi cant for both male and female adults. 
In contrast, eligible individuals who are out of the labor force (i.e., not 
working and not actively looking for work) have lower probabilities of 
awareness than employed eligibles for all four demographic groups. 
These results are consistent with the relative value of information about 
JTPA for the two groups.
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Table 6.6  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of JTPA Awareness 
among JTPA-Eligible Nonparticipants: Adults
Adult males Adult females
Fort Wayne 0.261 [0.055] −0.187 [−0.039]
(0.233) 0.264 (0.203) 0.356 
Jersey City 0.071 [0.015] −0.174 [−0.036]
(0.210) 0.736 (0.191) 0.364 
Providence           −0.268 [−0.054] −0.683 [−0.142]
(0.231) 0.245 (0.197) 0.001 
Black                0.414 [0.094] 0.288 [0.063]
(0.272) 0.128 (0.194) 0.138 
Hispanic             −0.486 [−0.102] −0.360 [−0.077]
(0.210) 0.021 (0.185) 0.051 
Other race/ethnicity −0.290 [−0.063] −0.348 [−0.074]
(0.279) 0.298 (0.255) 0.174 
Low English ability −0.763 [−0.147] −1.334 [−0.254]
(0.180) 0.000 (0.144) 0.000 
Aged 30–39 −0.345 [−0.073] −0.114 [−0.024]
(0.165) 0.037 (0.137) 0.405 
Aged 40–49 −0.372 [−0.078] −0.235 [−0.050]
(0.201) 0.064 (0.174) 0.177 
Aged 50–54 0.010 [0.002] −0.126 [−0.027]
(0.349) 0.977 (0.253) 0.619 
Highest grade < 10 −0.476 [−0.100] −0.836 [−0.180]
(0.179) 0.008 (0.135) 0.000 
Highest grade 10–11 −0.144 [−0.031] −0.126 [−0.028]
(0.210) 0.494 (0.173) 0.468 
Highest grade 13–15 0.102 [0.022] −0.263 [−0.058]
(0.239) 0.671 (0.201) 0.190 
Highest grade > 15 −0.387 [−0.082] −0.646 [−0.141]
(0.279) 0.166 (0.292) 0.027 
Currently married 0.019 [0.004] −0.239 [−0.051]
(0.181) 0.918 (0.162) 0.142 
Div.-wid.-sep.        0.718 [0.156] 0.112 [0.024]
(0.273) 0.009 (0.164) 0.494 
Child age < 6 years −0.079 [−0.016] −0.062 [−0.013]
(0.161) 0.623 (0.130) 0.635 
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Adult males Adult females
Current AFDC receipt 0.088 [0.019] −0.086 [−0.018]
(0.499) 0.859 (0.218) 0.694 
Current Food Stamp receipt 0.756 [0.164] 0.625 [0.133]
(0.251) 0.003 (0.187) 0.001 
Currently unemployed 0.805 [0.176] 0.628 [0.136]
(0.289) 0.005 (0.250) 0.012 
Currently out of the labor 
force
−0.182 [−0.037] −0.221 [−0.047]
(0.258) 0.481 (0.140) 0.115 
Family income $3,000–
$9,000 
−0.152 [−0.030] 0.604 [0.129]
(0.347) 0.662 (0.239) 0.012 
Family income $9,000–
$15,000 
−0.070 [−0.014] 0.389 [0.083]
(0.343) 0.838 (0.239) 0.104 
Family income > $15,000 0.377 [0.080] 0.156 [0.033]
(0.340) 0.267 (0.215) 0.469 
Constant             −0.359 [0.000] 0.238 [0.000]
(0.393) 0.361 (0.287) 0.407 
Number of observations 1,551 2,436
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, and 
p-values are below the mean derivatives. National JTPA Study data. Omitted catego-
ries in the logit are Corpus Christi, white, aged 22–29, highest grade equals 12, never 
married, no young children, not currently receiving AFDC, not currently receiving 
Food Stamps, currently employed, and family income less than $3,000. Using the 
sample proportion aware of JTPA as the cutoff, the within-sample prediction rates for 
adult males are 63.29 percent for aware eligibles and 62.95 percent for unaware eli-
gibles. The corresponding rates for adult females are 69.44 percent for aware eligibles 
and 61.82 percent for unaware eligibles.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
Table 6.6  (continued)
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Table 6.7  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of JTPA Awareness 
among JTPA-Eligible Nonparticipants: Youth
Male youth Female youth
Fort Wayne 0.054 [0.011] 0.150 [0.033]
(0.661) 0.935 (0.490) 0.759
Jersey City −0.147 [−0.031] −0.509 [−0.111]
(0.727) 0.839 (0.461) 0.270
Providence           −0.412 [−0.087] −0.686 [−0.153]
(0.666) 0.536 (0.438) 0.117
Black                1.183 [0.242] 0.902 [0.204]
(0.739) 0.109 (0.464) 0.052
Hispanic             0.189 [0.040] 0.298 [0.068]
(0.652) 0.772 (0.416) 0.475
Other race/ethnicity 1.348 [0.277] −0.813 [−0.167]
(1.370) 0.325 (0.610) 0.183
Low English ability −2.972 [−0.439] −2.373 [−0.393]
(0.751) 0.000 (0.664) 0.000
Aged 19–21 −0.891 [−0.187] −0.212 [−0.048]
(0.528) 0.091 (0.300) 0.478
Highest grade < 10 −0.025 [−0.005] −0.672 [−0.153]
(0.630) 0.968 (0.368) 0.068
Highest grade 10–11 0.280 [0.059] −0.077 [−0.018]
(0.592) 0.636 (0.405) 0.849
Highest grade > 12 −0.254 [−0.053] 0.063 [0.014]
(0.729) 0.728 (0.496) 0.898
Currently married 1.323 [0.266] 0.136 [0.031]
(0.819) 0.106 (0.370) 0.713
Div.-wid.-sep.          −0.584 [−0.119] −0.951 [−0.203]
(0.830) 0.482 (0.444) 0.032
Child age < 6 years −0.242 [−0.050] −0.164 [−0.037]
(0.758) 0.750 (0.323) 0.613
Current AFDC receipt −0.838 [−0.170] 0.329 [0.073]
(1.087) 0.441 (0.420) 0.433
Current Food Stamp 
receipt 
0.494 [0.103] −0.026 [−0.006]
(0.813) 0.543 (0.410) 0.950
Currently unemployed 0.522 [0.110] 0.362 [0.081]
(0.575) 0.363 (0.471) 0.442
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Male youth Female youth
Currently out of the labor 
force
−0.990 [−0.203] 0.000 [0.000]
(0.594) 0.095 (0.342) 1.000
Family income $3,000–
$9,000 
−0.907 [−0.188] 0.040 [0.009]
(0.915) 0.321 (0.441) 0.928
Family income $9,000–
$15,000 
−0.395 [−0.082] −0.321 [−0.072]
(0.938) 0.673 (0.555) 0.563
Family income > $15,000 −0.703 [−0.146] −0.410 [−0.092]
(1.031) 0.495 (0.534) 0.442
Constant             0.613 [0.000] 0.272 [0.000]
(1.019) 0.547 (0.633) 0.668
Number of observations 530 700
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, and 
p-values are below the mean derivatives. National JTPA Study data. Omitted catego-
ries in the logit are Corpus Christi, white, aged 16–18, highest grade equals 12, never 
married, no young children, not currently receiving AFDC, not currently receiving 
Food Stamps, currently employed, and family income less than $3,000. Using the 
sample proportion aware of JTPA as the cutoff, the within-sample prediction rates for 
male youth are 72.31 percent for aware eligibles and 64.86 percent for unaware eli-
gibles. The corresponding rates for female youth are 67.43 percent for aware eligibles 
and 53.64 percent for unaware eligibles.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
Table 6.7  (continued)
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While the concept of program awareness is a conceptually prob-
lematic one, the evidence presented here indicates that learning about 
the JTPA program and its eligibility requirements is not costless, and 
that the likelihood of becoming aware of the program varies in predict-
able ways. In particular, we fi nd that differences in information costs, 
information processing and language skills, and the expected value of 
information about the JTPA program (which is itself a function of the 
probability of participation in the program and its expected benefi t) can 
account for the patterns we observe in the data. Both the institutional 
structure of JTPA and our empirical fi ndings suggest little if any link 
between awareness and JTPA’s performance standards system. While 
local JTPA offi ces could in principle infl uence awareness by targeting 
specifi c groups or locations in their (quite limited) marketing efforts 
or by choosing contractors with links to specifi c subgroups among the 
eligible population, the indirect nature of these strategies suggests that 
even a program that wanted to cream-skim would likely devote its ef-
forts primarily to other margins. Moreover, fi ndings such as the positive 
effect of Food Stamp receipt on awareness argue against a major role 
for attempts to cream-skim at this stage in the participation process. Our 
analysis also suggests, however, that one way to boost program partici-
pation is to increase awareness among those eligible.
THE DETERMINANTS OF APPLICATION/
ACCEPTANCE INTO JTPA 
This section presents a logit analysis of the determinants of applica-
tion/acceptance (defi ned as reaching random assignment) conditional 
on program awareness using data on controls and ENPs from the NJS. 
We combine the application and acceptance stages here because we 
lack the data to examine them separately. Combining these two stages 
in the program participation process means that the patterns we ob-
serve refl ect the infl uence of individual decisions to apply and to persist 
through the (sometimes lengthy) application process, as well as JTPA 
staff decisions regarding referrals to other programs, the number of re-
quired visits to the JTPA offi ce and other hassle costs, what services to 
offer, and so on.
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Tables 6.8 and 6.9 report estimates of logit models of application/
acceptance into the JTPA program as a function of observed charac-
teristics for the four demographic groups. Coeffi cient estimates and 
estimated standard errors take account of the choice-based nature of 
the sample. The training site indicators included in the model have no 
behavioral interpretation, as the relative numbers of ENPs and controls 
at each site is an artifact of the study design. The notes to Tables 6.8 and 
6.9 summarize the within-sample predictive success of the models.12
The most dramatic result in Tables 6.8 and 6.9 is the powerful ef-
fect of recent labor force status dynamics on application/acceptance 
into JTPA.13 For both adult males and adult females, all of the labor 
force status pattern indicators have coeffi cients statistically different 
from zero, though many of the coeffi cients cannot be statistically dis-
tinguished from one another. In general, unemployed persons are the 
most likely to apply and be accepted into the JTPA program. For adult 
men, individuals who recently became unemployed, either by leaving 
employment or by reentering the labor force, have higher application/
acceptance probabilities than the long term (over six months) unem-
ployed. This difference does not appear for adult women.
Older adults have a lower conditional probability of application/
acceptance, consistent with conventional arguments that the return to 
training declines with age. The effect of years of completed schooling 
on acceptance into the program shows a hill-shaped pattern for adults, 
with individuals with fewer than 10 or more than 15 years of schooling 
having differentially low estimated application/acceptance probabili-
ties. This pattern reveals that it is more than just low rates of awareness 
that cause those with less than a high school education to have low rates 
of participation in JTPA conditional on eligibility. For youth, the prob-
ability of application/acceptance increases monotonically with years of 
schooling.
Relative to single, never married persons, currently married per-
sons have a statistically signifi cantly lower probability of application/
acceptance for three of the four demographic groups. Among adult 
men, but not the other three demographic groups, divorced, widowed, 
and separated persons also have lower probabilities of application/ac-
ceptance into JTPA.
The effect of living in a family receiving AFDC is negative for all 
four groups, and statistically signifi cant for three. In contrast, family 
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Adult males Adult females
Fort Wayne 2.334 [0.117] 1.878 [0.118]
(0.450) 0.000 (0.256) 0.000
Jersey City 1.120 [0.040] 1.228 [0.060]
(0.482) 0.020 (0.238) 0.000
Providence           1.547 [0.054] 1.720 [0.084]
(0.507) 0.002 (0.280) 0.000
Black                0.159 [0.008] −0.060 [−0.003]
(0.304) 0.600 (0.199) 0.763
Hispanic             −0.170 [−0.007] 0.964 [0.067]
(0.442) 0.701 (0.240) 0.000
Other race/ethnicity 1.228 [0.079] −0.169 [−0.008]
(0.455) 0.007 (0.494) 0.732
Aged 30–39 −0.564 [−0.028] −0.291 [−0.016]
(0.263) 0.032 (0.160) 0.069
Aged 40–49 −0.836 [−0.038] −0.226 [−0.013]
(0.396) 0.035 (0.224) 0.313
Aged 50–54 −0.766 [−0.036] −0.276 [−0.016]
(0.518) 0.139 (0.334) 0.408
Highest grade < 10 −0.950 [−0.040] −0.194 [−0.010]
(0.341) 0.005 (0.172) 0.258
Highest grade 10–11 −0.103 [−0.006] −0.112 [−0.006]
(0.331) 0.755 (0.184) 0.543
Highest grade 13–15 0.327 [0.020] 0.413 [0.027]
(0.332) 0.325 (0.208) 0.047
Highest grade > 15 −1.420 [−0.053] −0.500 [−0.024]
(0.550) 0.010 (0.767) 0.515
Currently married −0.875 [−0.043] −0.909 [−0.042]
(0.314) 0.005 (0.214) 0.000
Div.-wid.-sep.        −0.571 [−0.031] 0.142 [0.010]
(0.316) 0.071 (0.167) 0.398
Child age < 6 years −0.166 [−0.007] −0.185 [−0.010]
(0.349) 0.634 (0.159) 0.245
Current AFDC receipt −1.545 [−0.047] −0.975 [−0.050]
(0.691) 0.025 (0.232) 0.000
Current Food Stamp receipt 0.189 [0.009] 0.205 [0.012]
(0.323) 0.558 (0.191) 0.282
Table 6.8  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Acceptance into JTPA-
Aware ENP and Control Samples: Adults
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Adult males Adult females
Unemployed → employed 1.752 [0.068] 1.722 [0.080]
(0.390) 0.000 (0.325) 0.000
OLF → employed 2.372 [0.120] 1.122 [0.039]
(0.447) 0.000 (0.370) 0.002
Employed → unemployed 3.861 [0.328] 2.782 [0.210]
(0.430) 0.000 (0.277) 0.000
Unemployed → unemployed 2.615 [0.146] 2.862 [0.223]
(0.536) 0.000 (0.320) 0.000
OLF → unemployed 4.048 [0.360] 2.326 [0.144]
(0.566) 0.000 (0.324) 0.000




Employed → OLF 1.400 [0.055]
(0.314) 0.000
Unemployed → OLF 2.242 [0.134]
(0.452) 0.000
OLF → OLF 1.550 [0.055] 1.093 [0.037]
(0.556) 0.005 (0.260) 0.000
Family income $3,000–
$9,000 
−1.196 [−0.075] 0.269 [0.016]
(0.531) 0.024 (0.232) 0.246
Family income $9,000–
$15,000
−0.448 [−0.034] −0.023 [−0.001]
(0.480) 0.351 (0.339) 0.946
Family income > $15,000 −1.895 [−0.098] 0.034 [0.002]
(0.507) 0.000 (0.313) 0.914
Constant             −3.385 [0.000] −4.857 [0.000]
(0.564) 0.000 (0.385) 0.000
Number of observations 1,024 1,520
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, and 
p-values are below the mean derivatives. National JTPA Study data. Estimates refl ect 
weighting to account for choice-based sampling. Omitted categories in the logit are Cor-
pus Christi, white, aged 22–29, highest grade equals 12, never married, no young chil-
dren, not currently receiving AFDC, not currently receiving Food Stamps, “Employed → 
employed,” and family income less than $3,000. The categories “Employed → OLF” and 
“Unemployed → OLF” are combined due to small sample sizes. Using the population pro-
portion of persons accepted into JTPA (assumed to be 3 percent overall) to determine the 
cutoff, the within sample prediction rates for adult males are 81.06 for controls (applied 
and accepted into JTPA) and 81.38 for ENPs (did not apply or not accepted into JTPA). 
The corresponding rates for adult females are 65.94 for controls and 71.43 for ENPs.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
Table 6.8  (continued)
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Table 6.9  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Acceptance into JTPA-
Aware ENP and Control Samples: Youth
Male youth Female youth
Fort Wayne 2.268 [0.127] 0.750 [0.040]
(0.647) 0.000 (0.506) 0.139
Jersey City 1.445 [0.060] 0.462 [0.022]
(0.649) 0.026 (0.545) 0.396
Providence           3.627 [0.246] 1.218 [0.067]
(0.632) 0.000 (0.471) 0.010
Black                −0.793 [−0.030] 0.227 [0.011]
(0.515) 0.124 (0.434) 0.601
Hispanic             0.717 [0.046] 0.097 [0.005]
(0.628) 0.254 (0.439) 0.825
Other race/ethnicity −4.207 [−0.080] 0.971 [0.064]
(1.252) 0.001 (0.798) 0.223
Aged 19–21 0.285 [0.013] −0.451 [−0.024]
(0.460) 0.536 (0.328) 0.169
Highest grade < 10 −0.104 [−0.005] −0.028 [−0.001]
(0.508) 0.838 (0.421) 0.947
Highest grade 10–11 −0.187 [−0.009] −0.392 [−0.018]
(0.475) 0.693 (0.440) 0.373
Highest grade > 12 0.472 [0.028] 0.236 [0.014]
(0.845) 0.576 (0.441) 0.592
Currently married −1.225 [−0.042] −0.527 [−0.022]
(0.637) 0.055 (0.436) 0.227
Div.-wid.-sep.       0.155 [0.009] 0.316 [0.018]
(1.226) 0.899 (0.662) 0.633
Current AFDC receipt −1.455 [−0.043] −0.934 [−0.007]
(0.980) 0.137 (0.399) 0.019
Current Food Stamp 
receipt 
0.555 [−0.043] 1.311 [−0.042]
(0.580) 0.339 (0.370) 0.000
Child age < 6 years −1.294 [0.030] −0.139 [0.083]
(0.676) 0.056 (0.339) 0.681
Unemployed → 
employed 
2.110 [0.120] 1.776 [0.059]
(0.629) 0.001 (0.564) 0.002
OLF → employed −1.331 [−0.021] 2.243 [0.095]
(0.890) 0.135 (0.597) 0.000
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Male youth Female youth
Employed → 
unemployed 
2.087 [0.118] 3.648 [0.293]
(0.537) 0.000 (0.664) 0.000
Unemployed → 
unemployed
2.211 [0.130] 2.638 [0.137]
(0.706) 0.002 (0.591) 0.000
OLF → unemployed 1.285 [0.054] 3.292 [0.229]





Employed → OLF 1.462 [0.041]
(0.498) 0.003
Unemployed → OLF 0.845 [0.017]
(0.886) 0.340
OLF → OLF 2.387 [0.150] 1.201 [0.030]
(0.699) 0.001 (0.549) 0.029
Family income $3,000–
$9,000
3.867 [0.309] −0.386 [−0.015]
(0.748) 0.000 (0.536) 0.472
Family income $9,000–
$15,000
1.552 [0.055] 0.261 [0.013]
(0.746) 0.038 (0.691) 0.706
Family income > 
$15,000     
1.011 [0.028] 1.765 [0.149]
(0.764) 0.186 (0.535) 0.001
Constant             −6.787 [0.000] −4.732 [0.000]
(0.976) 0.000 (0.753) 0.000
Number of observations 436 540
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, and 
p-values are below the mean derivatives. National JTPA Study data. Estimates refl ect 
weighting to account for choice-based sampling. Omitted categories in the logit are 
Corpus Christi, white, aged 16–18, highest grade equals 12, never married, no young 
children, not currently receiving AFDC, not currently receiving Food Stamps, “Em-
ployed → employed,” and family income less than $3,000. The categories “Employed 
→ OLF” and “Unemployed → OLF” are combined due to small sample sizes. Using 
the population proportion of persons accepted into JTPA (assumed to be three percent 
overall) as the cutoff, the within sample prediction rates for male youth are 68.66 for 
controls (applied and accepted into JTPA) and 76.47 for ENPs (did not apply or not 
accepted into JTPA). The corresponding rates for female youth are 67.91 for controls 
and 69.57 for ENPs.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
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Food Stamp receipt has a positive infl uence in all cases. Interpreting 
the AFDC coeffi cient as the marginal effect of family AFDC receipt in 
addition to Food Stamps, it appears that among aware eligibles, AFDC 
recipients have much lower probabilities of application/acceptance into 
JTPA than do those receiving only Food Stamps. As the effect of young 
children in the home is being controlled for, this difference does not re-
sult from young children acting as a barrier to work or training outside 
the home.
The effects of family income differ across groups. High levels of 
family income reduce the probability of application/acceptance among 
adult males, have little effect for adult females, and raise the probability 
of participation for both youth groups. The availability of income from 
other family members to provide support during training appears to en-
courage youth to apply to JTPA.
We do not include measures of the state of the local economy at 
the four sites during the time that the ENP and control samples were 
collected in the specifi cations reported here. In other work, we estimate 
models including both county-level monthly unemployment rates aver-
aged over the counties constituting each of the sites, and interactions 
between these unemployment rates and the site indicators. Surprisingly, 
given the strong effects of individual unemployment found here, these 
variables never attain statistical signifi cance and never have a notice-
able impact on the proportion of correct predictions. One reason for this 
is that the number of ENPs whose month of measured (via the screen-
ing interview) eligibility occurs in a given calendar month depends not 
only on the size of the eligible population in that month, but also on 
the administrative schedule of the consulting fi rm doing the screening. 
A second reason is that the fl ow into the program, as measured by the 
number of persons randomly assigned in each calendar month, depends 
strongly on factors besides the local economy, including the academic 
schedule of the community colleges that provide much of the JTPA 
classroom training at these sites.
Our analysis of application/acceptance into JTPA conditional on 
eligibility reveals the fundamental importance of labor force status dy-
namics in determining who applies and is accepted into the program 
conditional on program awareness. A number of other factors includ-
ing age, schooling, marital status, and family income play important 
supporting roles. In terms of cream skimming, the institutions appear 
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to drive some measurable effects here, as caseworkers can affect the 
process once a potential participant applies to JTPA. For example, 
caseworkers sometimes required extra visits as a way of weeding out 
potential participants not seriously interested in services and/or employ-
ment. The overrepresentation of unemployed individuals who recently 
lost a job or reentered the labor market is consistent with a cream-
skimming story, though it is also consistent with the use of JTPA as a 
form of job search by such persons. The age, education, marital status, 
welfare, and family income patterns we estimate do not suggest a domi-
nant role for cream skimming, but they do not rule out a modest one, 
either.
THE DETERMINANTS OF ENROLLMENT IN JTPA
Formal enrollment constitutes the fi nal stage in the JTPA partici-
pation process. In this section we examine the determinants of the 
transition from acceptance into the program (defi ned as reaching ran-
dom assignment) to formal enrollment.14 A key difference between 
acceptance and enrollment is that, as noted in Chapters 3 and 4, only 
the outcomes of persons formally enrolled in JTPA infl uenced the re-
wards (or punishments) that a site received under the JTPA performance 
standards system. Training centers in JTPA had considerable (but not 
unlimited) discretion regarding whether (and when) to enroll persons 
accepted into the program. The performance standards system provided 
an incentive for training centers to delay enrollment until accepted ap-
plicants provided evidence that they were likely to obtain a job or to 
otherwise count favorably toward center performance. In practice, this 
sometimes meant that individuals receiving job search assistance were 
not enrolled until they found a job and that persons assigned to receive 
subsidized on-the-job training at private fi rms were not enrolled until a 
fi rm willing to provide them with such training had been located. For 
persons assigned to receive classroom training, training centers would 
often wait until trainees successfully attended class before enrolling 
them in the program. 
Another factor infl uencing enrollment decisions for persons recom-
mended for classroom training is their ability to maintain themselves 
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during the time they are enrolled in training. Classroom training typi-
cally lasts longer than employment-related services such as job search 
assistance. At the same time, unlike earlier programs such as CETA, 
JTPA provided no stipends to trainees except in unusual circumstances. 
Thus, the willingness of a person to pursue classroom training could 
depend on the availability of a stable income from outside sources. Two 
important sources of such income are transfer programs such as AFDC 
and family income. Thus, we would expect AFDC receipt and family 
income to have positive effects on the probability of enrollment.
At the same time, the lag between acceptance into the program 
and enrollment may lead to changes in the opportunity costs of par-
ticipation. Accepted applicants may receive job offers that dominate 
the training offered by JTPA, or they may experience illness or family 
problems that make it impossible for them to enroll. Alternatively, they 
may not care for the particular services offered by their caseworkers, or 
may not expect them to provide suffi cient benefi ts to justify their time, 
hassle, and opportunity costs. Thus, even though enrollment represents 
the stage in the participation process where JTPA staff members have 
both the greatest incentive to cream-skim and the most leverage to do 
so, the patterns we observe still represent the combined infl uence of 
their efforts and of individual decisions to continue in or drop out of 
the program. 
Tables 6.10 and 6.11 present the results of logit analyses of enroll-
ment for the four demographic groups using data on the experimental 
treatment group. The notes to the tables discuss the within-sample pre-
dictive performance of the model, which is quite good. We fi nd that the 
four training centers have very different overall enrollment rates, even 
controlling for the observable characteristics of their accepted appli-
cants. For all four demographic groups, accepted applicants at the Fort 
Wayne and Jersey City centers have enrollment probabilities substan-
tially lower than similar persons at Corpus Christi, which is the omitted 
training center in our analysis. These differences refl ect in part the dif-
fering mix of services offered at the various sites. As documented in 
Table 6.1, Corpus Christi offered mainly classroom training. This form 
of service leads to a higher enrollment rate than other JTPA services; 
see Kemple, Doolittle, and Wallace (1993). In contrast, Fort Wayne 
and, to a lesser extent, Jersey City, primarily offered on-the-job train-
ing and job search assistance. Centers offering these services will have 
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lower enrollment rates among accepted applicants because those who 
fail to locate a job or for whom no fi rm is willing to provide on-the-job 
training often do not ever get enrolled in the program.
Conditional on acceptance into JTPA, older adults are less likely 
to enroll than younger adults. This fi nding is consistent with the lower 
expected returns to training for older persons, which would make them 
relatively more likely to drop out of the program in response to a given 
outside opportunity. Family participation in the Food Stamp Program 
has a negative effect for three of the four demographic groups, with 
the effect both large and statistically signifi cant for adult females. To 
the extent that Food Stamp recipients are less likely to fi nd employ-
ment than other accepted applicants, this is consistent with creaming 
induced by the operation of JTPA performance standards. Also consis-
tent with these incentives is our fi nding that for women and male youth, 
having no employment experience strongly reduces the probability of 
enrollment.
Finally, we estimate a large positive effect of family income on 
the enrollment probability for adults. Family income may allow an ac-
cepted applicant to undertake training even in the absence of a stipend. 
Thus, even though higher family income lowers eligibility, it raises the 
probability of enrollment among accepted applicants.
Taken together, our fi ndings on the determinants of enrollment pro-
vide some suggestive, but not defi nitive, evidence of cream skimming. 
The strongest evidence comes from the systematic relationship between 
enrollment probabilities and service types across sites. Sites emphasiz-
ing subsidized on-the-job training, which provides greater enrollment 
fl exibility than classroom training, appear to make strategic use of that 
fl exibility. In terms of the covariates, explanations other than cream 
skimming can account for the age and family income effects. The rest 
lack any consistent pattern of precisely estimated coeffi cients across 
demographic groups. As such, we conclude only that, based primarily 
on site effects, our analysis of enrollment offers suggestive evidence in 
favor of cream skimming.
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Table 6.10  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Enrollment into JTPA  
Experimental Treatment Group: Adults
Adult males Adult females
Fort Wayne −0.692 [−0.163] −1.030 [−0.232]
(0.177) 0.000 (0.177) 0.000
Jersey City −1.157 [−0.274] −1.280 [−0.292]
(0.204) 0.000 (0.195) 0.000
Providence           0.447 [0.090] −0.563 [−0.121]
(0.198) 0.024 (0.199) 0.005
Black                −0.180 [−0.041] −0.240 [−0.056]
(0.129) 0.165 (0.132) 0.069
Hispanic             0.271 [0.060] 0.196 [0.045]
(0.181) 0.135 (0.176) 0.265
Other race/ethnicity −0.024 [−0.005] 0.637 [0.141]
(0.283) 0.933 (0.350) 0.068
Low English ability 0.288 [0.065] −0.082 [−0.019]
(0.241) 0.231 (0.210) 0.697
Aged 30–39 −0.105 [−0.023] 0.056 [0.013]
(0.114) 0.358 (0.115) 0.629
Aged 40–49 −0.483 [−0.109] −0.324 [−0.075]
(0.165) 0.003 (0.160) 0.042
Aged 50–54 −0.370 [−0.083] 0.055 [0.013]
(0.285) 0.195 (0.305) 0.856
Highest grade < 10 −0.129 [−0.029] −0.168 [−0.038]
(0.140) 0.357 (0.132) 0.203
Highest grade 10–11 −0.210 [−0.047] −0.041 [−0.009]
(0.130) 0.105 (0.124) 0.738
Highest grade 13–15 0.001 [0.000] −0.035 [−0.008]
(0.156) 0.993 (0.151) 0.817
Highest grade > 15 −0.204 [−0.046] −0.216 [−0.049]
(0.260) 0.432 (0.302) 0.475
Currently married 0.325 [0.073] 0.106 [0.024]
(0.154) 0.034 (0.167) 0.525
Div.-wid.-sep.        0.273 [0.061] 0.203 [0.046]
(0.135) 0.044 (0.121) 0.093
Child age < 6 years 0.109 [0.024] 0.336 [0.077]
(0.154) 0.480 (0.115) 0.004
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Adult males Adult females
Current AFDC receipt 0.132 [0.029] 0.158 [0.036]
(0.353) 0.709 (0.138) 0.253
Current Food Stamp receipt −0.070 [−0.016] −0.237 [−0.054]
(0.132) 0.595 (0.117) 0.044
Employed 1–6 months ago −0.060 [−0.013] 0.308 [0.071]
(0.164) 0.715 (0.150) 0.040
Employed 7–12 months ago −0.058 [−0.013] 0.216 [0.050]
(0.210) 0.781 (0.198) 0.276
Employed > 12 months ago 0.032 [0.007] 0.287 [0.066]
(0.211) 0.880 (0.177) 0.106
Never employed −0.085 [−0.019] 0.061 [0.014]
(0.227) 0.709 (0.192) 0.750
Family income $3,000–
$9,000 
−0.108 [−0.024] 0.211 [0.049]
(0.122) 0.378 (0.118) 0.073
Family income $9,000–
$15,000 
0.057 [0.013] 0.441 [0.100]
(0.165) 0.728 (0.166) 0.008
Family income
> $15,000 
0.483 [0.105] 0.599 [0.135]
(0.204) 0.018 (0.256) 0.019
Constant             0.498 [0.000] 0.596 [0.000]
(0.365) 0.172 (0.350) 0.088
Number of observations 1,886 2,012
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, 
and p-values are below the mean derivatives. National JTPA Study data. Estimation 
includes observations with imputed covariates due to relative high levels of item non-
response. Omitted categories in the logit are Corpus Christi, white, normal English 
ability, aged 22–29, highest grade equals 12, never married, no young children, not 
currently receiving AFDC, not currently receiving Food Stamps, currently employed, 
and family income less than $3,000. Using the sample proportion of accepted ap-
plicants enrolled into JTPA as the cutoff, the within-sample prediction rates for adult 
males are 62.48 percent for enrollees and 67.94 percent for nonenrollees. The cor-
responding rates for adult females are 57.64 percent for enrollees and 66.41 percent 
for nonenrollees.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
Table 6.10  (continued)
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Table 6.11  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Enrollment into JTPA 
Experimental Treatment Group: Youth
Male youth Female youth
Fort Wayne −1.213 [−0.241] −1.266 [−0.253]
(0.273) 0.000 (0.271) 0.000
Jersey City −1.350 [−0.274] −1.557 [−0.324]
(0.297) 0.000 (0.266) 0.000
Providence           −0.554 [−0.096] −0.597 [−0.103]
(0.276) 0.045 (0.276) 0.031
Black                −0.291 [−0.061] −0.223 [−0.048]
(0.191) 0.127 (0.210) 0.287
Hispanic             −0.044 [−0.009] 0.212 [0.043]
(0.241) 0.854 (0.250) 0.396
Other race/ethnicity 0.531 [0.102]
(0.533) 0.319
Low English ability −0.360 [−0.070] 0.113 [0.023]
(0.392) 0.358 (0.391) 0.773
Aged 19–21 −0.429 [−0.087] 0.036 [0.007]
(0.175) 0.014 (0.167) 0.830
Highest grade < 10 0.060 [0.012] 0.084 [0.017]
(0.213) 0.779 (0.204) 0.680
Highest grade 10–11 0.000 [0.000] 0.131 [0.027]
(0.192) 0.999 (0.183) 0.476
Highest grade > 12 0.064 [0.013] −0.111 [−0.023]
(0.405) 0.874 (0.355) 0.755
Currently married 0.138 [0.028] −0.052 [−0.011]
(0.335) 0.680 (0.302) 0.864
Div.-wid.-sep.    0.338 [0.066] 0.424 [0.083]
(0.729) 0.643 (0.381) 0.267
Child age < 6 years 0.279 [0.055] 0.092 [0.019]
(0.313) 0.373 (0.193) 0.632
Current AFDC receipt −0.699 [−0.151] 0.135 [0.028]
(0.336) 0.038 (0.241) 0.576
Current Food Stamp receipt 0.157 [0.032] −0.060 [−0.012]
(0.219) 0.474 (0.195) 0.757
Employed 1–6 months ago −0.228 [−0.044] −0.220 [−0.044]
(0.254) 0.370 (0.239) 0.357
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Male youth Female youth
Employed 7–12 months ago −0.467 [−0.093] −0.415 [−0.085]
(0.341) 0.170 (0.332) 0.211
Employed > 12 months ago −0.413 [−0.082] −0.353 [−0.072]
(0.409) 0.312 (0.328) 0.282
Never employed −0.657 [−0.134] −0.276 [−0.055]
(0.302) 0.030 (0.280) 0.324
Family income $3,000–
$9,000 
−0.057 [−0.012] 0.086 [0.018]
(0.185) 0.758 (0.176) 0.627
Family income $9,000–
$15,000
−0.463 [−0.099] 0.207 [0.042]
(0.234) 0.048 (0.272) 0.446
Family income > $15,000 0.301 [0.058] 0.116 [0.024]
(0.278) 0.279 (0.280) 0.680
Constant             2.505 [0.000] 1.453 [0.000]
(0.586) 0.000 (0.557) 0.009
Number of observations 923 962
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, 
and p-values are below the mean derivatives. National JTPA Study data. Estimation 
includes observations with imputed covariates due to relative high levels of item non-
response. Omitted categories in the logit are Corpus Christi, white, normal English 
ability, aged 16–18, highest grade equals 12, never married, no young children, not 
currently receiving AFDC, not currently receiving Food Stamps, currently employed, 
and family income less than $3,000. Using the sample proportion of accepted ap-
plicants enrolled into JTPA as the cutoff, the within-sample prediction rates for male 
youth are 60.20 percent for enrollees and 65.08 percent for nonenrollees. The cor-
responding rates for female youth are 57.51 percent for enrollees and 68.75 percent 
for nonenrollees.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
Table 6.11  (continued)
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DECOMPOSING THE PROCESS OF SELECTION INTO JTPA
In order to determine at what stage—enrollment (en), awareness 
(aw), acceptance (ac), or eligibility (el)—and in which direction par-
ticular observed characteristics operate to determine participation in the 
program, we use the chain rule to decompose the probability of partici-
pation in the following way: 
(6.7) 
            
Pr( 1 )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
(( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
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x
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This equation decomposes the effect of a change in x on the prob-
ability of participation in the program into its effect on each constituent 
probability weighted by the remaining probabilities. In each term, the 
component in square brackets is the effect of a change in x on one of 
the conditional probabilities leading to participation in the program. For 
dichotomous variables, we replace derivatives with fi nite changes.
Using Equation (6.7), we can assess through which channels, if any, 
variation in x operates to affect the probability of participation in JTPA. 
In this section, we present results for two different decompositions. The 
two decompositions differ in terms of the number of steps included, the 
)
.
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set of variables included, and the data used to perform the decomposi-
tion. These criteria are interrelated because the probability estimates 
are derived from different datasets and not all of the datasets contain all 
of the variables used to estimate the conditional probabilities discussed 
in the preceding sections. Reducing the number of stages enables us 
to estimate the effects of more explanatory variables. In addition, for 
certain variables some of the stages in Equation (6.7) are effectively 
eliminated. For example, belonging to a family that receives AFDC or 
Food Stamps makes the probability of eligibility equal to one. It is only 
informative to examine the effects of AFDC and Food Stamp receipt on 
the remaining components of the decomposition. 
The fi rst decompositions we present appear in Tables 6.12–6.15. 
The format of each table corresponds directly to Equation (6.7). The es-
timates of the probability of eligibility are based on the SIPP data. The 
estimates for the conditional probabilities of awareness, of application/
acceptance, and of enrollment all draw on data from the four sites in the 
National JTPA Study, with the fi rst two constructed using the pooled 
ENP and control group data and the last obtained from the experimental 
treatment group. The stark difference in geographic coverage between 
the samples for the fi rst stage and the later stages of the decomposition 
weakens our analysis, but this is unavoidable given the lack of compa-
rable data on the ineligible population at the four ENP sites. As in the 
earlier tables, the reported derivatives consist of sample averages of in-
dividual derivatives (or fi nite differences). They are not the derivatives 
evaluated at the sample means of the characteristics.15
The fi rst column in the table presents the overall effect of a change 
in the indicated characteristic x on the probability of enrollment; this 
is the term on the left-hand side of Equation (6.7). These values are 
expressed in terms of the expected change in the probability of partici-
pation resulting from the indicated change in characteristics, multiplied 
by 100 for ease of presentation. To put the terms in context, note that 
the unconditional probability of participation is around 0.03, so that an 
overall effect of −0.867, which is the effect for adult males of switching 
from a family income of $0–$3,000 to one over $15,000, translates into 
a change in the probability of −0.00867, or a reduction of nearly one-
third relative to the unconditional probability.
The second, fourth, sixth, and eighth columns of the fi rst panel 
present the four chain rule terms that compose the overall effect. Thus, 
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Table 6.12  JTPA Participation Simulation Results—Weighted and Unweighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics 


























Black 0.15813 0.17989 113.76 0.06623 41.88 −0.05204 −32.91 −0.03595 −22.74
(0.00174) (0.00194) (0.21) (0.00068) (0.20) (0.00054) (0.21) (0.00041) (0.15)
Hispanic −0.09954 0.12535 −125.93 −0.08245 82.83 −0.18921 190.08 0.04676 −46.98
(0.00121) (0.00137) (1.30) (0.00086) (0.54) (0.00198) (1.03) (0.00053) (0.30)
Other race/ethnicity 0.19616 0.17773 90.61 −0.07631 −38.90 0.08834 45.03 0.00643 3.28
(0.00202) (0.00193) (0.16) (0.00081) (0.19) (0.00084) (0.19) (0.00007) (0.02)
Aged 22–29 to
30–39 −0.20738 −0.07229 34.86 −0.04524 21.81 −0.08232 39.69 −0.00752 3.63
(0.00213) (0.00078) (0.05) (0.00046) (0.05) (0.00083) (0.06) (0.00009) (0.01)
40–49 −0.23873 −0.08673 36.33 −0.04657 19.51 −0.05507 23.07 −0.05034 21.09
(0.00252) (0.00095) (0.06) (0.00048) (0.04) (0.00056) (0.04) (0.00058) (0.05)
50–54 −0.31125 −0.12920 41.51 −0.00039 0.012 −0.12280 39.45 −0.05886 18.91
(0.00330) (0.00139) (0.05) (0.00000) (0.00) (0.00127) (0.05) (0.00067) (0.04)
Single, never married to
Married −0.05544 0.01257 −22.68 0.01334 −24.07 −0.12037 217.11 0.03899 −70.33
(0.00052) (0.00014) (0.15) (0.00014) (0.14) (0.00117) (0.69) (0.00044) (0.45)
Div.-wid.-sep. 0.09699 0.02779 28.66 0.10393 107.16 −0.06582 −67.86 0.03110 32.06
(0.00106) (0.00030) (0.10) (0.00106) (0.18) (0.00068) (0.37) (0.00035) (0.16)
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Highest grade = 12 to
< 10 −0.07920 0.08490 −107.19 −0.06366 80.37 −0.01038 126.74 −0.00008 0.10
(0.00091) (0.00093) (0.93) (0.00067) (0.44) (0.00105) (0.53) (0.00000) (0.00)
10–11 0.02426 0.03716 153.13 −0.01861 −76.70 0.02108 86.89 −0.01537 −63.33
(0.00027) (0.00041) (0.52) (0.00019) (0.46) (0.00021) (0.44) (0.00018) (0.44)
13–15 0.01822 −0.02288 −125.56 0.00813 44.64 0.01885 103.44 0.01412 77.48
(0.00019) (0.00026) (0.88) (0.00008) (0.25) (0.00019) (0.41) (0.00016) (0.31)
> 15 −0.24466 −0.00939 3.84 −0.05869 23.99 −0.17448 71.32 −0.00210 0.86
(0.00245) (0.00010) (0.01) (0.00060) (0.04) (0.00174) (0.05) (0.00002) (0.00)
No child < 6 years of 
age to child
  < 6 years  of age −0.09757 −0.02979 30.53 −0.00915 9.38 −0.07291 74.72 0.01429 −14.64
(0.00097) (0.00032) (0.07) (0.00009) (0.02) (0.00072) (0.10) (0.00016) (0.05)
Family income < $3,000 
to
$3,000–$9,000 −0.32777 −0.10544 32.17 −0.02445 7.46 −0.15696 47.89 −0.04095 12.49
(0.00344) (0.00116) (0.04) (0.00025) (0.02) (0.00161) (0.06) (0.00047) (0.03)
$9,000–$15,000 −0.47674 −0.25404 53.29 −0.03367 7.06 −0.15563 32.64 −0.03338 7.00
(0.00484) (0.00259) (0.05) (0.00035) (0.02) (0.00158) (0.04) (0.00038) (0.02)
> $15,000 −0.86666 −0.32102 37.04 0.01048 −1.21 −0.56750 65.48 0.01143 −1.32
(0.00493) (0.00250) (0.09) (0.00011) (0.01) (0.00274) (0.07) (0.00013) (0.01)
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Black               0.06693 0.11697 −0.00968 −0.07041
(0.00018) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005)
Hispanic            0.04687 −0.14448 −0.03352 0.08792
(0.00013) (0.00011) (0.00020) (0.00000)
Other race/ethnicity 0.06753 −0.13250 0.01774 0.01230
(0.00020) (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00000)
Aged 22–29 to
30–39 −0.02757 −0.08029 −0.01583 −0.01445
(0.00007) (0.00004) (0.00009) (0.00000)
40–49 −0.03277 −0.08247 −0.01053 −0.09820
(0.00009) (0.00004) (0.00006) (0.00003)
50–54 −0.04864 −0.00068 −0.02274 −0.11663
(0.00014) (0.00000) (0.00013) (0.00008)
Single, never married to
Married             0.00468 0.02359 −0.02424 0.07681
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00012) (0.00006)
Div.-wid.-sep.        0.01056 0.18502 −0.01223 0.05862
(0.00003) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00002)
chapter6.indd   170
chapter6.indd   170
4/27/2011   9:47:27 A
M
4/27/2011   9:47:27 A
M
   171
Highest grade = 12 to
< 10 0.03184 −0.11108 −0.01834 −0.00016
(0.00008) (0.00007) (0.00010) (0.00000)
10–11 0.01406 −0.03287 0.00410 −0.02980
(0.00004) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00000)
13–15 −0.00856 0.01443 0.00364 0.02700
(0.00002) (0.00000) (0.00002) (0.00000)
> 15 −0.00355 −0.10503 −0.03325 −0.00404
(0.00001) (0.00003) (0.00017) (0.00000)
No child < 6 years of age to
child < 6 years of age −0.01129 −0.01621 −0.01379 0.02742
(0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00007) (0.00001)
Family income < $3,000 to
$3,000–$9,000 −0.03797 −0.04304 −0.02817 −0.08075
(0.00013) (0.00000) (0.00017) (0.00006)
$9,000–$15,000 −0.08709 −0.05927 −0.03101 −0.06552
(0.00035) (0.00000) (0.00019) (0.00000)
> $15,000 −0.27189 0.01851 −0.22959 0.02226
(0.00040) (0.00001) (0.00043) (0.00000)
NOTE: Simulations use 1986 SIPP full panel data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. The standard errors refl ect variation 
due to the sample used to perform the simulations. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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Table 6.13  JTPA Participation Simulation Results—Weighted and Unweighted Effects of Changes in
Characteristics on the Probability of Participation in JTPA 1986 SIPP Panel Sample of JTPA

























Black 0.18225 0.17694 97.09 0.04858 26.66 −0.01011 −5.55 −0.03316 −18.20
(0.00074) (0.00074) (0.08) (0.00024) (0.09) (0.00005) (0.01) (0.00016) (0.05)
Hispanic 0.05725 0.06722 117.41 −0.03759 −65.65 −0.03785 −66.11 0.06547 114.36
(0.00027) (0.00028) (0.26) (0.00018) (0.28) (0.00018) (0.25) (0.00033) (0.36)
Other race/ethnicity 0.08121 0.06315 77.76 −0.05323 −65.54 0.00495 6.10 0.06633 81.68
(0.00037) (0.00026) (0.15) (0.00025) (0.22) (0.00002) (0.02) (0.00033) (0.18)
Aged 22–29 to
30–39 −0.06881 0.00439 −6.38 −0.00849 12.34 −0.07057 102.56 0.00587 −8.53
(0.00031) (0.00002) (0.01) (0.00004) (0.02) (0.00032) (0.00) (0.00003) (0.02)
40–49 −0.13415 0.00954 −7.11 −0.02645 19.72 −0.08264 61.60 −0.03461 25.80
(0.00064) (0.00004) (0.02) (0.00013) (0.03) (0.00039) (0.00) (0.00017) (0.03)
50–54 −0.17226 −0.02104 12.21 −0.02611 15.16 −0.13052 75.77 0.00540 −3.13
(0.00078) (0.00008) (0.02) (0.00013) (0.02) (0.00061) (0.05) (0.00003) (0.01)
Single, never married to
Married −0.25809 −0.11003 42.63 −0.03753 14.54 −0.13273 51.43 0.02221 −8.61
(0.00096) (0.00037) (0.03) (0.00018) (0.02) (0.00054) (0.03) (0.00011) (0.02)
Div.-wid.-sep. 0.05775 −0.00537 −9.30 0.00975 16.88 0.02610 45.20 0.02727 47.21
(0.00028) (0.00002) (0.02) (0.00005) (0.03) (0.00012) (0.03) (0.00014) (0.04)
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Highest grade = 12 to
< 10 −0.00028 0.12478 −45004.11 −0.09553 34456.05 −0.01200 4329.50 −0.01752 6320.56
(0.00039) (0.00050) (61725.88) (0.00048) (47143.37) (0.00006) (5926.98) (0.00009) (8658.46)
10–11 −0.02252 0.00440 −19.54 −0.00229 10.17 −0.01690 75.04 −0.00773 34.34
(0.00011) (0.00002) (0.05) (0.00001) (0.02) (0.00008) (0.06) (0.00004) (0.03)
13–15 0.00983 −0.02878 −292.81 −0.02655 −270.11 0.06390 650.14 0.00125 12.70
(0.00010) (0.00012) (2.80) (0.00013) (2.40) (0.00030) (5.07) (0.00001) (0.10)
> 15 −0.17329 −0.11342 65.45 −0.08481 48.94 0.04682 −27.02 −0.02190 12.64
(0.00072) (0.00045) (0.07) (0.00039) (0.04) (0.00022) (0.03) (0.00011) (0.02)
No child < 6 years of 
age to child
< 6 years 0.00212 0.03731 1763.02 −0.00557 −263.19 −0.06759 −3193.65 0.03797 1794.02
(0.00012) (0.00015) (103.67) (0.00003) (15.97) (0.00033) (194.88) (0.00019) (107.23)
Family income 
< $3,000 to
$3,000–$9,000 0.00364 −0.08450 −2322.85 0.06882 1891.74 0.01681 462.23 0.00250 68.81
(0.00022) (0.00037) (139.38) (0.00034) (108.34) (0.00008) (27.00) (0.00001) (4.04)
$9,000–$15,000 −0.14105 −0.18756 132.98 0.03819 −27.08 −0.02034 14.42 0.02862 −20.29
(0.00068) (0.00084) (0.13) (0.00019) (0.11) (0.00009) (0.04) (0.00014) (0.08)
> $15,000 −0.37947 −0.33806 89.09 0.00612 −1.61 −0.08725 22.99 0.03971 −10.46
(0.00114) (0.00098) (0.00) (0.00003) (0.01) (0.00036) (0.05) (0.00020) (0.04)
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Black               0.11936 0.10254 −0.00213 −0.07239
(0.00025) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00003)
Hispanic            0.04523 −0.07589 −0.00796 0.13711
(0.00010) (0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00006)
Other race/ethnicity 0.04237 −0.10664 0.00105 0.13905
(0.00009) (0.00004) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Aged 22–29 to
30–39 0.00292 −0.01759 −0.01495 0.01270
(0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00003) (0.00000)
40–49 0.00633 −0.05442 −0.01792 −0.07575
(0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00004) (0.00003)
50–54 −0.01395 −0.05343 −0.02759 0.01166
(0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00000)
Single, never married to
Married             −0.08046 −0.07888 −0.03365 0.04852
(0.00017) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00002)
Div.-wid.-sep.        −0.00355 0.02033 0.00566 0.05814
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00000)
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Highest grade = 12 to
< 10 0.08384 −0.18277 −0.00254 −0.03823
(0.00017) (0.00014) (0.00001) (0.00001)
10–11 0.00292 −0.00474 −0.00356 −0.01680
(0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00000)
13–15 −0.01898 −0.05459 0.01348 0.00270
(0.00005) (0.00000) (0.00002) (0.00000)
> 15 −0.07569 −0.17394 0.00970 −0.04777
(0.00020) (0.00009) (0.00002) (0.00002)
No child < 6 years of age to
child < 6 years 0.02473 −0.01154 −0.01397 0.08169
(0.00006) (0.00001) (0.00003) (0.00004)
Family income < $3,000 to
$3,000–$9,000 −0.05266 0.14643 0.00361 0.00541
(0.00015) (0.00006) (0.00001) (0.00000)
$9,000–$15,000 −0.11255 0.08099 −0.00431 0.06103
(0.00035) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00000)
> $15,000 −0.26155 0.01266 −0.02135 0.08726
(0.00039) (0.00001) (0.00003) (0.00000)
NOTE: Simulations use 1986 SIPP full panel data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. The standard errors refl ect variation 
due to the sample used to perform the simulations.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
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Black 0.18985 0.13157 69.30 0.19817 104.38 −0.08387 −44.18 −0.05602 −29.51
(0.00359) (0.00251) (0.59) (0.00360) (1.21) (0.00185) (0.94) (0.00127) (0.59)
Hispanic 0.16202 0.27921 172.33 0.00435 2.68 −0.16337 −100.84 0.04183 25.82
(0.00461) (0.00559) (2.31) (0.00008) (0.07) (0.00334) (3.13) (0.00098) (0.80)
Other race/ethnicity 0.11554 0.21151 183.06 0.19799 171.37 −.35420 −306.57 0.06022 52.12
(0.00528) (0.00417) (6.88) (0.00348) (7.34) (0.00742) (16.67) (0.00144) (2.69)
Aged 16–18 to
19–21 −0.04099 −0.05230 127.60 −0.12499 304.94 0.17496 −426.86 −0.03866 94.32
(0.00217) (0.00098) (5.88) (0.00224) (15.65) (0.00386) (26.88) (0.00091) (5.52)
Single, never married to
Married −0.09644 −0.14673 152.14 0.22705 −235.42 −0.20505 212.61 0.02827 −29.31
(0.00327) (0.00262) (3.74) (0.00400) (7.59) (0.00430) (4.65) (0.00067) (0.66)
Div.-wid.-sep. −0.45773 −0.18594 40.62 −0.16515 36.08 −0.12806 27.98 0.02142 −4.68
(0.00827) (0.00319) (0.18) (0.00311) (0.10) (0.00267) (0.16) (0.00051) (0.04)
Table 6.14  JTPA Participation Simulation Results—Weighted and Unweighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics
on the Probability of Participation in JTPA 1986 SIPP Panel Sample of JTPA Eligibles: Male Youth
(10,280 observations)
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Highest grade = 12 to
< 10 0.27423 0.19428 70.85 0.00450 1.64 0.05394 19.67 0.02152 7.85
(0.00480) (0.00358) (0.36) (0.00008) (0.01) (0.00110) (0.25) (0.00051) (0.10)
10–11 0.31709 0.15118 47.68 0.06286 19.82 0.09853 31.07 0.00451 1.42
(0.00559) (0.00287) (0.35) (0.00112) (0.13) (0.00200) (0.27) (0.00011) (0.02)
> 12 −0.15662 −0.00644 4.11 −0.08392 53.58 −0.06819 43.54 0.00192 −1.23
(0.00291) (0.00012) (0.05) (0.00152) (0.17) (0.00140) (0.20) (0.00005) (0.01)
No child < 6 years of 
age to child
< 6 years −0.06653 0.13831 −207.91 −0.02807 42.20 −0.20069 301.67 0.02392 −35.95
(0.00296) (0.00276) (9.74) (0.00051) (1.50) (0.00411) (9.40) (0.00057) (1.18)
Family income < 
$3,000 to
$3,000–$9,000 −0.02934 −0.38646 1317.34 −0.09657 329.20 0.47009 −1602.39 −0.01638 55.82
(0.00890) (0.00892) (577.07) (0.00178) (147.80) (0.00977) (750.37) (0.00038) (25.52)
$9,000–$15,000 −0.62620 −0.36139 57.71 0.00376 −0.60 −0.18625 29.74 −0.08230 13.14
(0.01208) (0.00660) (0.13) (0.00007) (0.01) (0.00378) (0.08) (0.00188) (0.08)
> $15,000 −1.13101 −0.85797 75.86 −0.07077 6.26 −0.22640 20.02 0.02411 −2.13
(0.00927) (0.00564) (0.21) (0.00126) (0.07) (0.00358) (0.18) (0.00056) (0.04)
(continued)
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Black               0.06224 0.23652 −0.01464 −0.10033
(0.00033) (0.00027) (0.00011) (0.00009)
Hispanic            0.12856 0.00515 −0.02811 0.07099
(0.00071) (0.00001) (0.00023) (0.00011)
Other race/ethnicity 0.09938 0.24597 −0.05971 0.10316
(0.00059) (0.00029) (0.00051) (0.00017)
Aged 16–18 to
19–21 −0.02447 −0.14922 0.02848 −0.06538
(0.00013) (0.00014) (0.00020) (0.00006)
Single, never married to
Married             −0.06715 0.28561 −0.03700 0.04882
(0.00043) (0.00023) (0.00032) (0.00007)
Div.-wid.-sep.        −0.08370 −0.18808 −0.02320 0.03693
(0.00060) (0.00048) (0.00018) (0.00006)
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Highest grade = 12 to
< 10 0.09339 0.00533 0.01010 0.03660
(0.00051) (0.00001) (0.00007) (0.00005)
10–11 0.07254 0.07497 0.01866 0.00780
(0.00039) (0.00009) (0.00013) (0.00001)
> 12 −0.00299 −0.09993 −0.01283 0.00333
(0.00002) (0.00013) (0.00009) (0.00000)
No child < 6 years of age to
child < 6 years 0.06409 −0.03296 −0.03545 0.04130
(0.00038) (0.00006) (0.00029) (0.00006)
Family income < $3,000 to
$3,000–$9,000 −0.13607 −0.10801 0.09427 −0.02889
(0.00150) (0.00018) (0.00035) (0.00003)
$9,000–$15,000 −0.17195 0.00445 −0.03412 −0.14599
(0.00229) (0.00001) (0.00027) (0.00013)
> $15,000 −0.57966 −0.08677 −0.05300 0.04362
(0.00228) (0.00010) (0.00026) (0.00006)
NOTE: Simulations use 1986 SIPP full panel data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. The standard errors refl ect variations 
due to the sample used to perform the simulation.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
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Table 6.15  JTPA Participation Simulation Results—Weighted and Unweighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics 


























Black 0.60673 0.25958 42.78 0.15867 26.15 0.23113 38.09 −0.04265 −7.03
(0.00343) (0.00170) (0.17) (0.00122) (0.08) (0.00153) (0.13) (0.00043) (0.04)
Hispanic 0.33973 0.13234 38.95 0.07296 21.48 0.03803 11.19 0.09640 28.38
(0.00237) (0.00086) (0.18) (0.00055) (0.07) (0.00031) (0.04) (0.00103) (0.14)
Other race/
ethnicity
0.52914 0.21732 41.07 −0.15091 −28.52 0.39674 74.98 0.06597 12.47
(0.00323) (0.00135) (0.24) (0.00124) (0.12) (0.00309) (0.24) (0.00071) (0.07)
Aged 16–18 to
19–21 −0.13182 0.00600 −4.55 −0.04413 33.48 −0.09964 75.58 0.00594 −4.51
(0.00103) (0.00004) (0.04) (0.00033) (0.09) (0.00080) (0.09) (0.00006) (0.02)
Single, never 
married to
Married −0.11438 0.04948 −43.26 0.02279 −19.93 −0.21716 189.86 0.03049 −26.66
(0.00122) (0.00031) (0.52) (0.00017) (0.15) (0.00170) (0.81) (0.00032) (0.20)
Div.-wid.-sep. 0.43598 0.16794 38.52 −0.13812 −31.68 0.34108 78.23 0.06509 14.93
(0.00272) (0.00102) (0.22) (0.00113) (0.13) (0.00267) (0.23) (0.00070) (0.08)
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Highest grade = 12 to
< 10 0.02402 0.10392 432.68 −0.13596 −566.07 0.03667 152.69 0.01939 80.72
(0.00062) (0.00064) (10.15) (0.00105) (17.22) (0.00030) (4.69) (0.00020) (2.47)
10–11 −0.04111 0.00763 −18.55 −0.03043 74.01 −0.03857 93.82 0.02026 −49.28
(0.00034) (0.00005) (0.16) (0.00023) (0.21) (0.00032) (0.27) (0.00021) (0.33)
> 12 −0.23797 −0.08057 33.86 −0.00592 2.49 −0.15552 65.35 0.00405 −1.70
(0.00153) (0.00052) (0.16) (0.00004) (0.01) (0.00120) (0.16) (0.00004) (0.01)
No child < 6 years of 
age to child
< 6 years 0.04561 0.16064 352.24 −0.01929 −42.29 −0.11019 −241.62 0.01445 31.68
(0.00111) (0.00095) (7.62) (0.00015) (1.20) (0.00094) (7.36) (0.00015) (0.95)
Family income
< $3,000 to
$3,000–$9,000 −0.21200 −0.20549 96.93 0.04033 −19.02 −0.02672 12.60 −0.02013 9.49
(0.00173) (0.00166) (0.09) (0.00030) (0.10) (0.00022) (0.08) (0.00021) (0.06)
$9,000–$15,000 −0.26501 −0.31212 117.78 −0.01785 6.73 0.05881 −22.19 0.00615 −2.32
(0.00243) (0.00277) (0.12) (0.00014) (0.03) (0.00049) (0.11) (0.00006) (0.01)
> $15,000 −0.29814 −0.64432 216.11 −0.06660 22.34 0.43046 −144.38 −0.01767 5.93
(0.00588) (0.00390) (3.51) (0.00050) (0.46) (0.00460) (4.09) (0.00018) (0.13)
(continued)
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Black               0.07514 0.18894 0.08124 −0.06723
(0.00020) (0.00012) (0.00038) (0.00006)
Hispanic            0.03805 0.08826 0.01283 0.14839
(0.00010) (0.00004) (0.00007) (0.00011)
Other race/ethnicity 0.06344 −0.17801 0.13083 0.10252
(0.00017) (0.00019) (0.00058) (0.00011)
Aged 16–18 to
19–21 0.00172 −0.05334 −0.03352 0.00931
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00016) (0.00001)
Single, never married to
Married             0.01431 0.02747 −0.07153 0.04781
(0.00004) (0.00002) (0.00036) (0.00003)
Div.-wid.-sep.        0.04896 −0.16342 0.11298 0.10116
(0.00013) (0.00015) (0.00052) (0.00011)
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Highest grade = 12 to
< 10 0.03018 −0.16072 0.01233 0.03028
(0.00008) (0.00015) (0.00006) (0.00003)
10–11 0.00219 −0.03662 −0.01290 0.03163
(0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00007) (0.00003)
> 12 −0.02355 −0.00714 −0.05464 0.00635
(0.00005) (0.00000) (0.00028) (0.00001)
No child < 6 years of age to
child < 6 years 0.04769 −0.02320 −0.03586 0.02259
(0.00012) (0.00002) (0.00019) (0.00002)
Family income < $3,000 to
$3,000–$9,000 −0.05959 0.04868 −0.00894 −0.03154
(0.00019) (0.00002) (0.00005) (0.00002)
$9,000–$15,000 −0.09455 −0.02149 0.01981 0.00962
(0.00035) (0.00001) (0.00010) (0.00001)
> $15,000 −0.19203 −0.08038 0.11196 −0.02763
(0.00017) (0.00002) (0.00045) (0.00002)
NOTE: Simulations use 1986 SIPP full panel data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. The standard errors refl ect variations 
due to the sample used to perform the simulation.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
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for the decomposition in Tables 6.12–6.15, the weighted eligibility term 
is given by the fi rst term on the right-hand side of Equation (6.7), the 
weighted acceptance term by the second term, the weighted awareness 
term by the third term, and the weighted enrollment term by the fourth 
term. The third, fi fth, seventh, and ninth columns present the percent-
age of the overall effect attributable to each of the four components. 
Thus, the third column indicates the percentage of the overall effect that 
results from the effect of the indicated change in x on the conditional 
probability of eligibility, which is given by the ratio of the weighted eli-
gibility term to the overall effect multiplied by 100. The second panel of 
each table presents the unweighted effect of the indicated change in x on 
each of the conditional probabilities. This unweighted effect is just the 
average partial derivative (or fi nite difference) of the probability with 
respect to the characteristic.
The results for race and ethnicity are especially striking. Blacks 
consistently have an overall probability of participation higher than that 
of whites. For three of the four demographic groups, this higher overall 
probability decomposes into higher conditional probabilities of eligi-
bility and awareness, but lower conditional probabilities of acceptance 
and enrollment. Decomposing the overall effect in this way makes it 
clear where blacks fall out of the participation process, and suggests 
that policy measures designed to increase their participation should 
likely focus relatively more attention on the stages of application, ac-
ceptance, and enrollment, rather than on changes in eligibility rules or 
on outreach efforts to increase awareness, although such measures may 
still bear fruit. This evidence indicates that the concerns expressed in 
GAO (1991) regarding minority participation may not have been mis-
placed. Administrative discretion may have played a role in reducing 
black participation in JTPA, and may continue to do so under WIA.
A different pattern emerges for the categorical age variables. For 
adults, older persons nearly always have lower conditional probabili-
ties at every stage in the participation process relative to persons aged 
22–29. The same is true of youth, where a modest overall negative ef-
fect for 19–21-year-olds relative to 16–18-year-olds is mirrored at each 
stage in the process except for the application/acceptance stage for male 
youth and the eligibility and enrollment stages for female youth.
Overall, being married rather than being single decreases the prob-
ability of participation in JTPA for all four demographic groups. The 
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dominant factor lowering enrollment among married persons is a strong 
negative effect of marriage on the conditional probability of application/
acceptance. For adult males, this negative term outweighs a positive 
effect of marriage on the conditional probabilities of eligibility, aware-
ness, and enrollment. The probability of participation for divorced, 
widowed, or separated persons exceeds that for single persons in three 
of the four groups. For adult males, positive effects of having once been 
married on eligibility, awareness, and enrollment dominate the negative 
acceptance term, while all but the eligibility term are positive for adult 
females.
For adults, the relationship between the overall probability of 
participation in JTPA and years of completed schooling is roughly hill-
shaped, with its peak occurring at 10–11 years of completed schooling 
for men and 13–15 years for women. The decompositions reveal that 
the overall relationship results from combining a negative relationship 
between years of schooling and eligibility, and generally hill-shaped re-
lationships between schooling and awareness, application/acceptance, 
and enrollment. For youth, the overall relationship between participa-
tion and years of completed schooling peaks at 10–11 years for males 
and at less than 10 years for females.
For three of the four demographic groups, the overall effect of 
having an own child under six years of age in the home breaks down 
into a positive component due to increased conditional probabilities of 
eligibility and enrollment, and negative components due to decreased 
probabilities of awareness and acceptance. The overall effect is nega-
tive for men and positive for women.
The overall probability of participation in JTPA decreases mono-
tonically in family income for adult males and male and female youth, 
and peaks in the $3,000–$9,000 category for adult females. The strong 
negative relationship between family income and the probability of 
eligibility described earlier in the chapter dominates the overall ef-
fect in almost every case. The exception is the peak for adult females, 
which results from the infl uence of a similarly peaked pattern in the 
relationship between family income and the conditional probabilities of 
awareness and of application/acceptance for that group.
Tables 6.16–6.19 present a second set of decompositions. In these 
tables, we decompose the probability of application/acceptance con-
ditional on eligibility into components due to awareness and due to 
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Table 6.16  JTPA Simulation Results—Two-Step Decomposition 
 Weighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics on the Probability of Acceptance into JTPA  















Black 2.5149 (0.0675) 1.5521 (0.0495) 61.72 (0.66) 0.9628 (0.0257) 38.28 (0.66)
Hispanic −2.9536 (0.0902) −2.6335 (0.0844) 89.16 (0.25) −0.3201 (0.0087) 10.84 (0.25)
Other race/ethnicity 5.8446 (0.1485) −1.4193 (0.0457) −24.28 (0.85) 7.2639 (0.1668) 124.28 (0.85)
Aged 22–29 to
30–39 −3.7082 (0.0993) −1.3499 (0.0433) 36.40 (0.62) −2.3583 (0.0664) 63.60 (0.62)
40–49 −4.2680 (0.1146) −1.2858 (0.0412) 30.13 (0.55) −2.9822 (0.0838) 69.87 (0.55)
50–54 −2.5991 (0.0765) 0.1994 (0.0064) −7.67 (0.22) −2.7985 (0.0803) 107.67 (0.22)
Highest grade 12 to
< 10 −6.5763 (0.1825) −2.1992 (0.0693) 33.44 (0.54) −4.3771 (0.1279) 66.56 (0.54)
10–11 −1.4067 (0.0380) −0.7153 (0.0233) 50.85 (0.70) −0.6914 (0.0193) 49.15 (0.70)
13–15 2.1957 (0.0557) 0.5977 (0.0192) 27.22 (0.57) 1.5980 (0.0430) 72.78 (0.58)
> 15 −7.3700 (0.2089) −1.6050 (0.0516) 21.78 (0.40) −5.7650 (0.1688) 78.22 (0.40)
Not receiving AFDC to
Current AFDC receipt −5.5477 (0.1714) 0.4306 (0.0138) −7.76 (0.22) −5.9783 (0.1800) 107.76 (0.23)
Not receiving Food Stamps to
Current Food Stamp receipt 4.4612 (0.1165) 2.8726 (0.0897) 64.39 (0.68) 1.5886 (0.0424) 35.61 (0.68)
Two most recent labor force 
statuses from employed → 
employed to
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Unemployed → employed 11.1319 (0.2484) 2.8784 (0.0920) 25.86 (0.60) 8.2535 (0.1969) 74.14 (0.60)
OLF → employed 15.2249 (0.3061) 2.6670 (0.0845) 17.52 (0.45) 12.5578 (0.2646) 82.48 (0.44)
Employed → unemployed 23.9905 (0.4532) 2.8125 (0.0946) 11.72 (0.31) 21.1780 (0.3998) 88.28 (0.31)
Unemployed → unemployed 15.9797 (0.3196) 3.6041 (0.1122) 22.55 (0.55) 12.3756 (0.2652) 77.45 (0.55)
OLF → unemployed 28.6514 (0.4525) 6.4026 (0.2087) 22.35 (0.59) 22.2488 (0.3654) 77.65 (0.59)
Employed → OLF 25.9317 (0.3865) −1.6591 (0.0530) −6.40 (0.22) 27.5908 (0.3904) 106.40 (0.22)
Unemployed → OLF 30.8787 (0.4021) −4.9403 (0.1627) −16.00 (0.67) 35.8191 (0.3365) 116.00 (0.67)
OLF → OLF 6.8828 (0.1859) −0.0298 (0.0009) −0.43 (0.01) 6.9126 (0.1864) 100.43 (0.03)
No child < 6 years of age to
child < 6 years −0.9468 (0.0270) −0.5962 (0.0190) 62.97 (0.71) −0.3506 (0.0114) 37.03 (0.71)
Family income < $3,000 to
$3,000–$9,000 −5.2227 (0.1744) −0.1078 (0.0034) 2.06 (0.06) −5.1149 (0.1725) 97.94 (0.04)
$9,000–$15,000 −2.4054 (0.0750) −0.1520 (0.0048) 6.32 (0.18) −2.2535 (0.0722) 93.68 (0.19)
> $15,000 −6.8375 (0.2571) 1.6230 (0.0511) −23.74 (0.94) −8.4605 (0.2804) 123.74 (0.94)
Corpus Christi site to
Fort Wayne site 12.6473 (0.3162) 1.0828 (0.0346) 8.56 (0.22) 11.5644 (0.2958) 91.44 (0.23)
Jersey City site 6.3780 (0.1534) 0.3288 (0.0105) 5.16 (0.15) 6.0492 (0.1490) 94.84 (0.16)
Providence site 6.4292 (0.1691) −1.5965 (0.0509) −24.83 (0.95) 8.0257 (0.1824) 124.83 (0.95)
Never married to
Currently married −4.9098 (0.1401) 0.4562 (0.0145) −9.29 (0.31) −5.3660 (0.1467) 109.29 (0.31)
Married 1–24 months ago 4.3002 (0.1261) 4.2079 (0.1252) 97.85 (0.04) 0.0923 (0.0025) 2.15 (0.07)
Married > 24 months ago 5.3340 (0.1391) 3.6192 (0.1166) 67.85 (0.73) 1.7147 (0.0441) 32.15 (0.73)
NOTE: Simulations use National JTPA Study data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. These standard errors refl ect variation 
in the samples used to do the simulations. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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Table 6.17  JTPA Simulation Results—Two-Step Decomposition 
 Weighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics on the Probability of Acceptance into JTPA 















Black 0.3406 (0.0082) 0.5807 (0.0110) 170.49 (1.57) −0.2401 (0.0044) −70.49 (1.57)
Hispanic 2.5843 (0.0514) −1.5509 (0.0312) −60.01 (1.29) 4.1352 (0.0709) 160.01 (1.29)
Other race/ethnicity −0.5642 (0.0140) −0.9772 (0.0192) 173.22 (1.55) 0.4130 (0.0074) −73.22 (1.55)
Aged 22–29 to
30–39 −1.5293 (0.0272) −0.2304 (0.0044) 15.07 (0.18) −1.2989 (0.0238) 84.93 (0.17)
40–49 −1.0421 (0.0184) −0.3973 (0.0075) 38.12 (0.30) −0.6449 (0.0120) 61.88 (0.30)
50–54 −0.9142 (0.0163) −0.3667 (0.0071) 40.12 (0.30) −0.5474 (0.0102) 59.88 (0.30)
Highest grade 12 to
< 10 −2.6424 (0.0495) −2.0099 (0.0393) 76.06 (0.21) −0.6325 (0.0119) 23.94 (0.21)
10–11 −0.8521 (0.0151) −0.2605 (0.0050) 30.57 (0.27) −0.5916 (0.0109) 69.43 (0.27)
13–15 1.4035 (0.0265) −0.5493 (0.0103) −39.14 (0.72) 1.9527 (0.0332) 139.14 (0.72)
> 15 −3.5102 (0.0668) −1.4343 (0.0283) 40.86 (0.26) −2.0760 (0.0410) 59.14 (0.26)
Not receiving AFDC to
Current AFDC receipt −3.9558 (0.0809) −0.0051 (0.0001) 0.13 (0.00) −3.9507 (0.0808) 99.87 (0.00)
Not receiving Food Stamps to
Current Food Stamp receipt 2.4674 (0.0416) 1.3765 (0.0242) 55.79 (0.30) 1.0908 (0.0201) 44.21 (0.30)
Two most recent labor force 
statuses from employed → 
employed to
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Unemployed → employed 10.1978 (0.1374) 0.2336 (0.0044) 2.29 (0.04) 9.9642 (0.1353) 97.71 (0.00)
OLF → employed 6.0237 (0.0963) −0.6424 (0.0123) −10.66 (0.17) 6.6660 (0.1040) 110.66 (0.18)
Employed → unemployed 20.0536 (0.2370) 1.9825 (0.0363) 9.89 (0.15) 18.0711 (0.2195) 90.11 (0.15)
Unemployed → unemployed 19.1886 (0.2369) 1.1889 (0.0234) 6.20 (0.12) 17.9997 (0.2287) 93.80 (0.11)
OLF → unemployed 13.1690 (0.1825) 0.8147 (0.0151) 6.19 (0.09) 12.3543 (0.1737) 93.81 (0.09)
Employed → OLF 7.3442 (0.1160) 0.2988 (0.0056) 4.07 (0.06) 7.0454 (0.1125) 95.93 (0.04)
Unemployed → OLF 13.9890 (0.1926) −0.6109 (0.0118) −4.37 (0.08) 14.5999 (0.1989) 104.37 (0.05)
OLF → OLF 4.2671 (0.0845) −0.9764 (0.0188) −22.88 (0.45) 5.2435 (0.0952) 122.88 (0.46)
No child < 6 years of age to
child < 6 years −0.8987 (0.0173) −0.1516 (0.0029) 16.87 (0.21) −0.7471 (0.0151) 83.13 (0.20)
Family income < $,3000 to
$3,000–$9,000 2.1865 (0.0390) 1.1198 (0.0208) 51.22 (0.38) 1.0667 (0.0215) 48.78 (0.38)
$9,000–$15,000 1.0367 (0.0183) 0.6227 (0.0117) 60.07 (0.38) 0.4140 (0.0083) 39.93 (0.37)
> $15,000 0.5172 (0.0107) −0.0683 (0.0013) −13.20 (0.22) 0.5855 (0.0116) 113.20 (0.23)
Corpus Christi site to
Fort Wayne site 7.6811 (0.1556) −0.6637 (0.0124) −8.64 (0.19) 8.3448 (0.1608) 108.64 (0.18)
Jersey City site 5.4065 (0.0990) −0.7513 (0.0147) −13.90 (0.24) 6.1578 (0.1084) 113.90 (0.23)
Providence site 7.3382 (0.1506) −2.0068 (0.0412) −27.35 (0.62) 9.3450 (0.1711) 127.35 (0.62)
Never married to
Currently married −3.7900 (0.0758) −0.3984 (0.0077) 10.51 (0.13) −3.3915 (0.0697) 89.49 (0.12)
Married 1–24 months ago 3.1004 (0.0569) −0.0496 (0.0009) −1.60 (0.02) 3.1499 (0.0576) 101.60 (0.00)
Married > 24 months ago 6.3540 (0.1107) 0.5205 (0.0100) 8.19 (0.11) 5.8335 (0.1038) 91.81 (0.12)
NOTE: Simulations use National JTPA Study data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. These standard errors refl ect variation 
in the samples used to do the simulations. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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Table 6.18  JTPA Simulation Results—Two-Step Decomposition 
 Weighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics on the Probability of Acceptance into JTPA 















Black 4.8041 (0.2699) 6.6041 (0.2893) 137.47 (2.52) −1.7999 (0.0720) −37.47 (2.52)
Hispanic 5.9390 (0.2145) 0.2688 (0.0123) 4.53 (0.22) 5.6701 (0.2112) 95.47 (0.22)
Other race/ethnicity −3.1888 (0.3835) 6.6837 (0.3157) −209.60 (28.11) −9.8724 (0.4783) 309.60 (28.11)
Aged 16–18 to
19–21 −1.1238 (0.2264) −5.3078 (0.2366) 472.32 (109.67) 4.1840 (0.1576) −372.32 (109.67)
Never married to
Currently married 2.1384 (0.3343) 7.4097 (0.3489) 346.50 (54.91) −5.2712 (0.2273) −246.50 (54.91)
Div.-wid.-sep. −3.4641 (0.1330) −2.0780 (0.0950) 59.99 (1.04) −1.3862 (0.0561) 40.01 (1.04)
Highest grade 12 to
< 10 −0.3731 (0.0267) −0.6401 (0.0292) 171.56 (6.06) 0.2670 (0.0103) −71.56 (6.06)
10–11 1.9636 (0.0810) 1.6799 (0.0760) 85.55 (0.59) 0.2837 (0.0110) 14.45 (0.59)
> 12 −1.8382 (0.0667) −0.6697 (0.0305) 36.43 (1.04) −1.1685 (0.0468) 63.57 (1.04)
Not receiving AFDC to
Current AFDC receipt −11.1117 (0.4965) −4.2387 (0.1942) 38.15 (0.74) −6.8730 (0.3298) 61.85 (0.74)
Not receiving Food Stamps to
Current Food Stamp receipt 3.7423 (0.1253) 1.8386 (0.0835) 49.13 (1.20) 1.9037 (0.0692) 50.87 (1.20)
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Two most recent labor force 
statuses from employed → 
employed to
Unemployed → employed 14.4300 (0.3934) 1.1809 (0.0536) 8.18 (0.40) 13.2491 (0.3886) 91.82 (0.40)
OLF → employed −4.5935 (0.2030) 0.5569 (0.0255) −12.12 (0.57) −5.1505 (0.2159) 112.12 (0.57)
Employed → unemployed 16.6120 (0.4569) 3.5322 (0.1670) 21.26 (0.93) 13.0798 (0.4174) 78.74 (0.93)
Unemployed → unemployed 10.3782 (0.2823) 3.2308 (0.1478) 31.13 (1.11) 7.1474 (0.2211) 68.87 (1.11)
OLF → unemployed 0.3517 (0.0666) −1.2450 (0.0573) −354.01 (72.52) 1.5967 (0.0634) 454.01 (72.52)
Employed → OLF 26.9129 (1.1099) −8.8298 (0.4202) −32.81 (2.70) 35.7427 (0.8344) 132.81 (2.70)
Unemployed → OLF 5.5548 (0.3447) 7.5616 (0.3597) 136.13 (2.89) −2.0068 (0.0916) −36.13 (2.89)
OLF → OLF 6.9113 (0.5004) −6.8417 (0.3147) −98.99 (10.08) 13.7529 (0.4157) 198.99 (10.08)
No child < 6 years of age to
child < 6 years −9.2754 (0.4498) −1.9897 (0.0911) 21.45 (0.67) −7.2856 (0.3823) 78.55 (0.67)
Family income < $,3000 to
$3,000–$9,000 9.3512 (0.4811) −4.6211 (0.2073) −49.42 (3.64) 13.9722 (0.4734) 149.42 (3.64)
$9,000–$15,000 −2.6233 (0.1288) −3.1610 (0.1402) 120.50 (1.17) 0.5377 (0.0256) −20.50 (1.17)
> $15,000 −4.7303 (0.1979) −3.8578 (0.1714) 81.56 (0.69) −0.8725 (0.0425) 18.44 (0.69)
Corpus Christi site to
Fort Wayne site 10.3470 (0.3620) 0.3657 (0.0169) 3.53 (0.17) 9.9813 (0.3578) 96.47 (0.17)
Jersey City site 3.0515 (0.1968) −1.4890 (0.0675) −48.80 (3.80) 4.5406 (0.2061) 148.80 (3.80)
Providence site 18.4090 (0.6361) −2.3738 (0.1081) −12.89 (0.76) 20.7827 (0.6359) 112.89 (0.75)
NOTE: Simulations use National JTPA Study data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. These standard errors refl ect variation 
in the samples used to do the simulations. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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Table 6.19  JTPA Simulation Results—Two-Step Decomposition 
 Weighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics on the Probability of Acceptance into JTPA 















Black 3.9275 (0.1724) 3.0290 (0.1451) 77.12 (0.49) 0.8985 (0.0322) 22.88 (0.49)
Hispanic 1.0273 (0.0415) 0.5037 (0.0249) 49.03 (0.75) 0.5236 (0.0189) 50.97 (0.75)
Other race/ethnicity 2.8539 (0.1085) −2.4043 (0.1197) −84.25 (5.34) 5.2582 (0.1592) 184.25 (5.34)
Aged 16–18 to
19–21 −2.3024 (0.0867) −0.5579 (0.0272) 24.23 (0.54) −1.7445 (0.0634) 75.77 (0.54)
Never married to
Currently married −1.5024 (0.0587) 0.6539 (0.0321) −43.52 (1.63) −2.1563 (0.0833) 143.52 (1.63)
Div.-wid.-sep. −1.1802 (0.0922) −2.5635 (0.1267) 217.21 (7.55) 1.3833 (0.0481) −117.21 (7.55)
Highest grade 12 to
< 10 −2.0172 (0.0973) −2.0554 (0.0984) 101.89 (0.00) 0.0381 (0.0014) −1.89 (0.05)
10–11 −1.7373 (0.0661) −0.4037 (0.0200) 23.24 (0.50) −1.3336 (0.0487) 76.76 (0.51)
> 12 1.0272 (0.0355) −0.0518 (0.0025) −5.04 (0.16) 1.0790 (0.0375) 105.04 (0.15)
Not receiving AFDC to
Current AFDC receipt −2.3463 (0.0926) 1.2829 (0.0633) −54.68 (2.33) −3.6292 (0.1378) 154.68 (2.33)
Not receiving Food Stamps to
Current Food Stamp receipt 6.5595 (0.2010) 0.1105 (0.0054) 1.68 (0.06) 6.4490 (0.1971) 98.32 (0.07)
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Two most recent labor force 
statuses from employed → 
employed to
Unemployed → employed 9.5744 (0.2550) −0.4118 (0.0203) −4.30 (0.18) 9.9862 (0.2662) 104.30 (0.18)
OLF → employed 11.3506 (0.2832) −1.8182 (0.0898) −16.02 (0.81) 13.1688 (0.3136) 116.02 (0.81)
Employed → unemployed 24.0502 (0.4336) −1.4540 (0.0712) −6.05 (0.31) 25.5041 (0.4422) 106.05 (0.32)
Unemployed → unemployed 17.0906 (0.4181) 1.2007 (0.0580) 7.03 (0.29) 15.8899 (0.3908) 92.97 (0.29)
OLF → unemployed 21.6456 (0.4132) 0.3991 (0.0197) 1.84 (0.09) 21.2465 (0.4105) 98.16 (0.08)
Employed → OLF 8.6803 (0.2773) 1.4078 (0.0686) 16.22 (0.52) 7.2725 (0.2306) 83.78 (0.53)
Unemployed → OLF 7.1564 (0.2625) 3.3152 (0.1614) 46.32 (0.97) 3.8412 (0.1313) 53.68 (0.97)
OLF → OLF 4.6998 (0.1774) −1.0262 (0.0503) −21.84 (0.98) 5.7260 (0.2065) 121.84 (0.99)
No child < 6 years of age to
child < 6 years −1.3768 (0.0594) −0.8447 (0.0417) 61.36 (0.74) −0.5320 (0.0210) 38.64 (0.74)
Family income < $3,000 to
$3,000–$9,000 −0.8170 (0.0328) 0.1014 (0.0050) −12.41 (0.43) −0.9184 (0.0366) 112.41 (0.43)
$9,000–$15,000 −0.7310 (0.0416) −0.9901 (0.0490) 135.45 (1.50) 0.2591 (0.0101) −35.45 (1.50)
> $15,000 8.3821 (0.2512) −1.1948 (0.0593) −14.25 (0.59) 9.5768 (0.2877) 114.25 (0.59)
Corpus Christi site to
Fort Wayne site 3.5282 (0.1269) 0.3522 (0.0173) 9.98 (0.30) 3.1761 (0.1138) 90.02 (0.30)
Jersey City site 0.3881 (0.0532) −1.5274 (0.0769) −393.62 (69.52) 1.9155 (0.0728) 493.62 (69.53)
Providence site 3.5378 (0.1675) −2.1585 (0.1040) −61.01 (3.86) 5.6963 (0.2075) 161.01 (3.86)
NOTE: Simulations use National JTPA Study data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. These standard errors refl ect variation 
in the samples used to do the simulations. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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application/acceptance given awareness. Omitting the stages of eligi-
bility and enrollment allows us to simulate using the same ENP and 
control data from the National JTPA Study that we use to estimate the 
conditional probabilities of awareness and of application/acceptance. 
Omitting the enrollment stage allows us to include variables represent-
ing recent labor force status transitions, which are not available in the 
treatment group data we use to estimate the probability of enrollment. 
Otherwise, the format of the tables and the construction of the indi-
vidual terms parallels that for the decompositions already discussed.
The basic patterns for those variables, such as age and schooling, 
included in the earlier decompositions remain essentially the same as 
for the decompositions previously discussed, so we do not dwell on 
them here. Of great interest are the decompositions of the overall ef-
fects of family receipt of AFDC and Food Stamps on the application/
acceptance probabilities. The overall effect of AFDC receipt is nega-
tive for all four groups. For both groups of adults, the overall effect 
decomposes into a small effect due to awareness, combined with a large 
negative effect of living in a family receiving AFDC on the probability 
of application/acceptance conditional on awareness. For male youth, 
living in a family receiving AFDC has negative effects of equal size on 
awareness and on application/acceptance given awareness. For female 
youth positive awareness and negative application and acceptance ef-
fects cancel to yield a small overall effect.
All four demographic groups show a positive impact of living in a 
family receiving Food Stamps on the probability of application/accep-
tance. For all the groups except female youth, this effect decomposes 
into roughly equal positive effects of Food Stamp receipt on the prob-
abilities of awareness and of application/acceptance conditional on 
awareness. For female youth, the contribution of the awareness term 
is negligible, leaving the impact of living in a family receiving Food 
Stamps on application/acceptance to dominate the overall effect. Inter-
preting the effect of AFDC receipt as measuring the difference between 
receiving both AFDC and Food Stamps and just Food Stamps, we fi nd 
that AFDC receipt primarily discourages application/acceptance.
Finally, examination of the decompositions for the variables repre-
senting the two most recent labor force statuses at the time of random 
assignment or eligibility screening shows that in all cases it is the effect 
of these statuses on the probability of application/acceptance condi-
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tional on awareness that accounts for their large positive effects on the 
unconditional probability of application/acceptance. The estimated ef-
fects of labor force status transitions on awareness are small and are 
of mixed sign, with negative estimated effects usually associated with 
transitions out of the labor force.
These decompositions offer unique insights regarding the effects 
of characteristics such as race, age, education, transfer program par-
ticipation, labor force status, and family income on the various stages 
of the process by which individuals select and are selected into the 
JTPA program. For many characteristics, such as race and ethnicity, 
the same characteristic has competing effects at different stages of the 
process. Other characteristics, such as age among adults, operate in the 
same direction on the conditional probabilities of program eligibility, 
awareness, application/acceptance, and formal enrollment. Sorting out 
the effects of particular characteristics at each step enriches our un-
derstanding of the overall participation process and demonstrates quite 
clearly that much of the action in terms of subgroup differences arises 
at stages in the participation process over which JTPA staff have little 
or no control.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter lays out a framework for studying the determinants 
of participation in social programs using data on random samples of 
individuals at each stage in the participation process. We outline the 
evidence our framework can provide regarding cream skimming by 
program staff, perhaps motivated by the incentives resulting from 
administrative performance standards, in the context of what we call 
mutually voluntary programs. In such programs, participation depends 
on the choices of both potential participants and program staff. In that 
context, our framework can provide only suggestive evidence for or 
against cream skimming based on characteristics observed by both the 
researcher and the program staff, except in the special case where pro-
gram staff completely control certain stages of the process. Except in 
that special case, our framework cannot provide the sort of defi nitive 
positive evidence of caseworker responses to performance incentives 
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obtained by studies that rely on exogenous variation in the existence or 
nature of those incentives, such as Courty, Kim, and Marschke (forth-
coming). When caseworkers (or other program staff) have little or no 
control over specifi c stages of the process, our framework also reveals 
the importance of factors other than cream skimming in generating dif-
ferences in participation among groups. 
We apply our framework to data from the JTPA program, which 
allows us to decompose participation into the stages of eligibility, 
awareness, application/acceptance, and enrollment. From the perspec-
tive of this volume, two major empirical fi ndings emerge from this 
analysis. Although they arise from data on JTPA, the similarity between 
JTPA and other programs (including its successor WIA) documented in 
Chapter 2 suggests that they likely apply more broadly. 
The fi rst major fi nding is that much of the action in terms of dif-
ferences in participation rates across groups occurs at stages in the 
participation process over which program staff have little or no control. 
This fi nding highlights the dangers of inferring cream skimming from 
simple comparisons of program participants and program eligibles.
The second major fi nding is that we fi nd only modest evidence of 
cream skimming at the stages of the participation process where JTPA 
caseworkers arguably do have some infl uence, namely enrollment, and 
to a lesser extent, application and acceptance. Several factors may ac-
count for this lack of strong evidence, particularly relative to the amount 
of attention cream skimming receives in discussions of performance 
management systems for employment and training programs. 
First, caseworkers may have goals that confl ict with those of the 
performance management system. Given the relatively indirect and 
low-powered incentives offered by the system, they may choose to in-
dulge those goals. Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996) use data from 
Corpus Christi, the only site in the NJS to collect good data on appli-
cants, to study the transition from application to enrollment. They fi nd 
evidence that caseworkers prefer applicants with relatively weak, rather 
than relatively strong, expected labor market outcomes in the absence 
of the program. This suggests that caseworker preferences for serving 
the most disadvantaged may overcome the incentives provided by the 
performance standards system in some contexts. 
Second, JTPA caseworkers faced many constraints other than the 
performance standards system. Local JTPA offi ces faced political con-
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straints emanating from politicians, businesspeople, community groups, 
and service providers. For example, Smith (1992) shows that three of 
the four sites analyzed here underserve (relative to its representation in 
the eligible population) the race/ethnic group locally in the majority, 
even when that group is black. This may refl ect political pressures to 
cater to marginal voting blocks. Some or all of these other pressures 
may weigh against the incentives for cream skimming provided by the 
performance measures. They may also lead program staff to focus on 
alternative forms of strategic behavior aimed at improving their mea-
sured performance, such as those discussed in Chapter 7.
Third, Courty, Kim, and Marschke (forthcoming) suggest a role 
for the regression model developed by the USDOL and used to adjust 
the performance standards faced by local JTPA offi ces for differences 
in participants’ observed characteristics. Although optional for states 
at the time, all of the states with sites in the NJS used the regression 
adjustment model. The model relied on data from prior years on the 
relationship between participants’ characteristics and their postprogram 
labor market outcomes. If the model worked as intended, it should have 
diminished or even eliminated the incentive sites faced to cream-skim 
based on the observed characteristics included in the adjustment model. 
Many of those same characteristics appear in our model, with the result 
that if the regression adjustment did its job, we should not expect to fi nd 
much evidence of cream skimming in our analysis. Of course, program 
staff may still have tried very hard to select participants based on char-
acteristics not included in the adjustment model.
Fourth, the empirical patterns generated by participant choices may 
simply overshadow the efforts of the caseworkers, even at the stages of 
the participation process where caseworkers have the most infl uence.
Overall, the results of our empirical analysis provide valuable in-
sights into the importance of cream skimming under JTPA and suggest 
the value of a similar but richer analysis using data from the current 
WIA program.
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Notes
1. In addition to issues related to the effects of performance standards, Heckman and 
Smith (2004) focus on how decomposing the participation process illuminates the 
causes of differences in program participation across groups more generally and 
how it contributes to the selection and specifi cation of econometric evaluation 
estimators.
2. More recent work in this area includes Aizer (2007); Bitler, Currie, and Scholz 
(2003); Burton, Macher, and Mayo (2007); Dahan and Nisan (2009); and Kleven 
and Kopczuk (2008).
3. A related literature considers how participants get allocated to services within pro-
grams that provide more than one service. See Plesca and Smith (2007) and Mitnik 
(2009) and the references therein.
4. The act also specifi es additional eligibility criteria for several small groups. In the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data used in our analysis, we 
are not able to accurately measure foster child status, disability, or homelessness 
on a monthly basis, and so are unable to implement the special eligibility rules 
applicable to these groups in selecting our sample of eligibles. However, these 
groups represent a very small portion of the overall eligible population, and many 
of those eligible under the special provisions will also be eligible under the basic 
family income and program participation criteria described in the text.
5. Program year 1991 covers the period from July 1991 to June 1992.
6. Two other details regarding JTPA eligibility deserve note. First, the implementa-
tion of the rules varied somewhat across localities, as states and training centers 
had some discretion over exactly what did and did not constitute family income 
and what did and did not constitute a family for the purposes of the program. 
Devine and Heckman (1996) fi nd these differences too small to affect the patterns 
discussed here. Second, the eligibility rules described here are those in place at 
the time our data were collected. Some small changes in rules took place after that 
time; see Devine and Heckman (1996) or USDOL (1993).
7. See Doolittle and Traeger (1990) for a discussion of the implementation of the 
NJS and Bloom et al. (1997) and Orr et al. (1996) for summaries of the impact 
estimates.
8. Appendices A and B in Heckman and Smith (2003) provide additional detail re-
garding the NJS and SIPP samples used in our analyses.
9. Doolittle and Traeger (1990), Kemple, Doolittle, and Wallace (1993), and Orr et 
al. (1996) all provide even more detail about the sites in the National JTPA Study.
10. We present mean derivatives and not derivatives evaluated at the mean of the x. 
That is, we calculate the derivative (or fi nite difference for binary variables) for 
each observation and report the (weighted) sample mean. The literature sometimes 
refers to these as mean marginal effects. The standard errors take account of the 
use of multiple observations on the same individuals. 
11. The English language ability variable should be interpreted with caution as it 
arises from different underlying measures in the ENP and control group samples. 
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For the ENPs, lack of English ability is measured by the language in which the 
respondent chose to complete the baseline survey, while for the controls it is ob-
tained from a question on language preference administered around the time of 
random assignment.
12. Appendix C of Heckman and Smith (2003) provides additional details regarding 
the methods used to obtain the reported results.
13. Heckman and Smith (1999) discuss the importance of these variables at greater 
length. See also Card and Sullivan (1988) and Dolton and Smith (2010).
14. Heckman, Smith and Taber (1998) discuss nonenrollment within the experimen-
tal treatment group and its implications for the evaluation of JTPA. See also the 
general discussions of treatment group dropout and control group substitution in 
Heckman et al. (2000) and Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999).
15. Appendix C of Heckman and Smith (2003) contains a detailed discussion of the 
simulations.
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